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I	  would	  like	  to	  thank	  Professor	  YOSHIMATSU	  Hidetaka	  for	  his	  valuable	  feedback.	  I	  have	  taken	  his	  
comments	  into	  serious	  consideration	  and	  made	  the	  necessary	  changes	  accordingly.	  
	  
First,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  provide	  analytical	  frameworks.	  The	  current	  manuscript	  lacks	  clear	  frameworks	  
for	  an	  analysis.	  The	  student	  needs	  to	  set	  up	  several	  research	  questions	  (they	  are	  shown	  in	  abstract)	  in	  
Introduction	  section.	  The	  student	  then	  needs	  to	  provide	  answers	  to	  the	  questions	  in	  conclusion	  
(chapter	  7).	  
	  
à	  I	  have	  made	  a	  new	  “4.5.	  TTIP	  in	  the	  analytical	  framework”	  where	  I	  explain	  why	  the	  TTIP	  is	  
a	  good	  RTA	  in	  light	  of	  the	  WTO	  system.	  I	  have	  also	  added	  some	  remarks	  in	  the	  Conclusion	  
that	  address	  more	  clearly	  the	  research	  questions	  
	  
Second,	  the	  author	  needs	  to	  rationalise	  why	  the	  TTIP	  was	  selected	  to	  examine	  as	  a	  representative	  of	  
RTAs.	  There	  are	  so	  many	  RTAs	  including	  the	  recently	  agreed	  TPP.	  The	  student	  shows	  why	  an	  analysis	  
of	  the	  TTIP	  is	  important	  for	  achieving	  the	  overall	  objective	  of	  the	  thesis	  as	  an	  independent	  section	  as	  
3.8.	  
	  
à	  I	  have	  added	  a	  point”	  3.8.	  Why	  the	  TTIP”	  in	  which	  I	  explain	  my	  personal	  and	  topical	  
reasons	  for	  choosing	  the	  TTIP	  as	  a	  research	  subject.	  
	  
Third,	  the	  student	  is	  encouraged	  to	  set	  up	  linkages	  between	  theories	  and	  empirical	  analyses.	  As	  the	  
student	  spends	  several	  pages	  on	  theoretical	  views	  on	  regionalism	  such	  as	  realism	  and	  liberalism,	  it	  is	  
useful	  to	  examine	  the	  TTIP’s	  problems	  and	  relevance	  to	  the	  EU	  from	  these	  theoretical	  standpoints.	  
	  
à	  I	  have	  set	  up	  the	  linkages	  between	  the	  theories	  and	  empirical	  analyses	  in	  point	  4.5.	  where	  
I	  also	  address	  the	  analytical	  framework.	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Abstract	  	  
	  
First,	  I	  looked	  into	  the	  legal framework	  of	  the	  exemption	  clause	  to	  the	  Most-­‐Favoured	  Nation	  principle(MFN)	  
provided	  by	  article	  XXIV	  GATT(General	  Agreement	  on	  Tariffs	  and	  Trade)	  and	  article	  V	  GATS(General	  Agreement	  
on	  Trade	  in	  services).	  This	  forms	  the	  objective	  legal	  research	  question	  of	  how	  and	  why	  the	  WTO	  allows	  
exemptions	  for	  RTAs.	  Secondly,	  I	  focused	  on	  the	  potential	  global	  influence	  of	  the	  TTIP	  and	  place	  it	  in	  the	  
broader	  context	  of	  the	  the	  general	  theoretical	  framework	  of	  regionalisation	  to	  see	  if	  it	  
	  
Despite	  some	  potential	  dangers,	  RTAs	  are	  in	  fact	  a	  positive	  phenomenon	  for	  the	  multilateral	  trading	  system.	  
Especially	  with	  global	  trade	  negotiations	  stagnating,	  we	  need	  a	  new	  dynamic	  and	  regionalisation	  might	  be	  it.	  
This	  being	  said,	  I	  am	  acutely	  aware	  of	  the	  negative	  effects	  of	  RTAs	  and	  these	  will	  be	  adressed	  as	  well.	  
	  
This	  is	  a	  very	  hot	  topic	  in	  the	  world	  of	  the	  WTO	  and	  the	  global	  multilateral	  trading	  negotiations.	  I	  feel	  like	  we	  
have	  arrived	  at	  a	  crossroads	  after	  the	  lagging	  of	  the	  Doha	  Development	  Agenda.	  The	  multilateral	  trading	  
system	  failed	  in	  conducting	  efficient	  negotiations	  and	  this	  lead	  to	  an	  even	  greater	  surge	  in	  RTAs.	  The	  WTO	  
cannot	  but	  take	  a	  clear	  stance	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  RTAs	  because	  it	  is	  a	  reality	  they	  have	  to	  accept	  and	  deal	  with	  if	  they	  
want	  to	  be	  taken	  seriously	  in	  the	  future.	  A	  lot	  of	  scholars	  are	  currently	  researching	  this	  topic	  which	  makes	  it	  	  a	  
very	  relevant	  research	  .	  Researching	  current	  RTAs	  is	  not	  a	  simple	  task	  since	  they	  come	  in	  different	  formats,	  
scopes,	  membership	  et	  cetera.	  RTAs	  are	  like	  your	  children,	  each	  one	  of	  them	  is	  unique	  in	  their	  own	  special	  way.	  
Most	  studies	  agree	  this	  agreement	  can	  be	  a	  global	  economic	  milestone,	  for	  better	  or	  for	  worse.	  
	  
I	  have	  chosen	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  TTIP	  because	  it	  reflects	  best	  the	  current	  attitude	  on	  RTAs.	  It	  is	  an	  example	  of	  the	  
new	  regionalism	  and	  can	  form	  a	  stepping	  stone	  for	  global	  liberalisation	  if	  it	  plays	  its	  cards	  right.	  The	  TTIP	  is	  a	  
form	  of	  deep	  integration	  and	  does,	  therefore,	  not	  form	  a	  stumbling	  stone	  for	  the	  WTO.	  
	  	  






Since	  the	  mid-­‐1990’s	  Free	  Trade	  Agreements	  (hereinafter	  FTAs)	  or	  Regional	  Trade	  Agreements	  (hereinafter	  
RTAs)	  have	  known	  a	  significant	  surge,	  both	  in	  quantity	  and	  importance.	  The	  increasing	  economic	  integration	  on	  
a	  regional	  level	  leads	  to	  benefits	  as	  well	  as	  complexities.	  Especially	  in	  the	  World	  Trade	  Organization’s	  
(hereinafter	  WTO)	  multilateral	  trade	  system,	  regionalisation	  is	  met	  with	  lukewarm	  and	  sometimes	  
contradicting	  feelings.	  Some	  authors	  fear	  that	  the	  increasing	  regionalisation	  is	  eroding	  the	  multilateral	  trading	  
system	  whilst	  others	  think	  of	  it	  as	  stepping-­‐stones	  or	  building	  blocks.	  Thus my research question is how and 
why the WTO allows exemptions for RTAs, and secondly on the potential influences of the TTIP (Trans-
atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership) in the broader context of regionalism. This research is analytical 
and qualitative by following theoretical views on multilateral approach in trade and regionalism and and 
focusing on the significances and impacts of TTIP. 
	  
	  
Due	  to	  the	  rapid	  evolution	  in	  communication	  and	  logistics	  amongst	  a	  world	  of	  major	  economic	  players,	  
globalisation	  has	  gained	  momentum	  during	  these	  last	  few	  decades.	  This	  makes	  globalisation	  a	  rather	  new	  
phenomenon	  compared	  to	  regionalisatioin	  in	  the	  light	  of	  history.	  Regionalisation	  has	  been	  around	  since	  the	  
Ancient	  Egyptians	  sailed	  the	  Meditteranean	  and	  the	  Roman	  built	  their	  empire.	  This	  dynamic	  shows	  that	  
regionalisation	  and	  globalisation	  are	  not	  contradicting,	  but	  rather	  complementing	  each	  other	  throughout	  
history.	  
	  
There	  are	  quite	  a	  few	  definitions	  of	  ‘regionalism’	  and	  ‘regionalisation’	  circulating	  in	  the	  academic	  world,	  but	  for	  
the	  sake	  of	  this	  thesis	  we	  will	  focus	  solely	  on	  trade	  regionalisation.	  In	  order	  to	  convey	  efficient	  research	  it	  is	  
important	  to	  understand	  what	  these	  concepts	  mean.	  According	  to	  Schulz,	  Söderbaum	  &	  Öjendal	  (2001)	  
regionalism	  sensu	  latissimo	  describes	  formal	  processes	  and	  projects.	  Sensu	  stricto	  regionalism	  is	  ‘the	  body	  of	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ideas,	  values	  and	  concrete	  objectives	  that	  try	  to	  maintain,	  create	  or	  modify	  the	  security,	  wealth,	  peace	  and	  
development	  within	  a	  region.”	  Schulz	  et	  al.	  (2001)	  state	  that	  regionalism	  means	  the	  urge	  to	  merge (Schulz, 
Söderbaum, & Öjendal, 2001).	  	  
	  
Regionalisation	  implies	  an	  activist	  element,	  as	  we	  can	  derive	  from	  the	  lexical	  form.	  According	  to	  Schulz	  et	  al.	  
(2001)	  regionalisation	  is	  ‘the	  empirical	  process	  of	  change	  from	  relative	  heterogeneity	  and	  lack	  of	  cooperation	  
towards	  increased	  cooperation,	  integration,	  convergence,	  coherence	  and	  identity	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  fields	  such	  as	  
culture,	  security,	  economic	  development,	  politics	  etc.	  within	  a	  given	  geographical	  space.’	  	  
	  
On	  the	  official	  website	  of	  the	  WTO	  we	  can	  find	  a	  definition	  of	  ‘regionalism’	  as	  defined	  in	  the	  Dictionary	  of	  
Trade	  Policy	  Terms:	  “actions	  by	  governments	  to	  liberalize	  or	  facilitate	  trade	  on	  a	  regional	  basis,	  sometimes	  
through	  free-­‐trade	  areas	  or	  customs	  unions”.	  –WTO	  website	  
RTAs	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  WTO,	  however,	  are	  interpreted	  more	  generally	  and	  more	  specifically	  at	  the	  same	  
time	  compared	  to	  this	  definition.	  First,	  they	  are	  interpreted	  in	  a	  more	  general	  than	  just	  ‘regional’,	  because	  
often	  RTAs	  are	  concluded	  between	  countries	  that	  do	  not	  belong	  to	  the	  same	  geographical	  region.	  This	  is	  the	  
case	  for	  the	  TTIP	  as	  it	  is	  negotiated	  between	  the	  two	  transatlantic	  partners,	  the	  US	  and	  the	  EU.	  Secondly,	  RTAs	  
in	  the	  WTO	  context	  are	  interpreted	  more	  specifically	  through	  the	  WTO	  legal	  provisions	  that	  set	  out	  specific	  
conditions	  for	  preferential	  trade	  liberisation. (WTO website)	  
	  
The	  Transatlantic	  Trade	  and	  Investment	  Partnership	  (henceforth	  TTIP)	  also	  known	  in	  some	  countries	  as	  
Transatlantic	  Free	  Trade	  Area	  (TAFTA)	  is	  a	  free	  trade	  agreement	  that	  is	  being	  negotiated	  between	  the	  United	  
States	  of	  America	  (USA)	  and	  the	  European	  Union	  (EU).	  The	  goal	  of	  this	  massive	  trade	  agreement	  is	  to	  create	  
economic	  growth	  and	  more	  jobs	  for	  both	  parties	  by	  minimising	  trade	  barriers.	  The	  substantial	  lowering	  of	  trade	  
barriers	  would	  lead,	  according	  to	  the	  European	  Commission,	  to	  a	  boost	  of	  trade	  in	  goods	  and	  services,	  as	  well	  
as	  facilitating	  investment.	  Officially,	  negotiations	  started	  on	  the	  8th	  of	  July	  2013 (Delegation of the European 
Union to United States, 2013)	  (European Commission, 2013).	  	  The	  idea	  of	  such	  an	  agreement	  between	  Europe	  
and	  the	  US	  is	  not	  a	  new	  idea.	  Klaus	  Kinkel,	  former	  minister	  of	  foreign	  affairs	  from	  Germany,	  already	  proposed	  
this	  kind	  of	  agreement	  back	  in	  1995 (Leibniz-institut für Wirtschaftvorschung Center for economic studies, 
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2013).	  It	  is	  important	  to	  follow	  the	  negotiations	  of	  TTIP	  because	  if	  it	  does	  get	  concluded	  it	  will	  encompass	  
around	  40%	  of	  the	  global	  economic	  output.	  This	  makes	  it	  the	  biggest	  bilateral	  trade	  and	  investment	  agreement	  
ever	  undertaken (European Commission, 2013).	  
	  
	  
The	  TTIP	  should	  be	  seen	  in	  context	  of	  regionalisation	  in	  a	  globalising	  world.	  These	  two	  processes	  might	  seem	  
incompatible	  at	  first	  sight,	  but	  a	  deeper	  look	  into	  the	  issue	  will	  reveal	  that	  regionalisation	  and	  globalisation	  are	  
not	  mutually	  exclusive.	  One	  of	  the	  reasons	  why	  states	  still	  rely	  on	  regional	  trade	  agreements	  (RTAs)	  is	  the	  
stagnation	  of	  the	  multilateral	  trading	  system (Lynch, 2010).	  RTAs	  can	  further	  liberalise	  trade	  despite	  lagging	  
multilateral	  negotiations	  like	  the	  fiasco	  at	  the	  Doha	  Development	  Round.	  The	  Doha	  Round	  started	  in	  2001	  but	  
so	  far,	  no	  substantial	  agreements	  have	  been	  made.	  It	  has	  been	  almost	  14	  years,	  which	  is	  too	  long	  for	  most	  
countries	  to	  wait	  for	  further	  trade	  liberalisation.	  Rodrigo	  de	  Rato,	  former	  managing	  director	  of	  the	  
International	  Monetary	  Fund,	  and	  Paul	  Wolowitz,	  former	  president	  of	  the	  World	  Bank,	  warned	  the	  stagnating	  
Doha	  Development	  Agenda	  will	  cause	  a	  shift	  to	  more	  bilateral	  or	  regional	  free	  trade	  agreements	  that	  will	  have	  
significant	  consequences	  for	  the	  future	  of	  the	  multilateral	  trade	  system (De Rato & Wolfowitz, 2006).	  	  
	  
The	  most	  important	  benefit	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  TTIP	  would	  be	  the	  insurance	  and	  facilitation	  of	  investment	  by	  
setting	  in	  place	  an	  investor-­‐to-­‐state	  dispute	  settlement	  (ISDS)	  system.	  Although	  both	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  USA	  
already	  have	  advanced	  levels	  of	  legal	  remedies,	  some	  claim	  that	  a	  unified	  ISDS	  mechanism	  would	  lead	  to	  more	  
investors	  insurance.	  There	  is	  however	  the	  risk	  of	  ‘regulatory	  chill’,	  meaning	  that	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  ISDS	  
mechanism	  might	  discourage	  government	  from	  creating	  legitimate	  changes	  in	  regulations	  in	  environment,	  
health	  and	  social	  policies	  of	  fear	  of	  arbitration.	  This	  kind	  of	  ‘regulatory	  chill’	  can	  be	  avoided	  in	  the	  TTIP	  given	  
that	  the	  investment	  protection	  standards	  are	  carefully	  defined,	  exception	  clauses	  are	  exhaustively	  drafted	  and	  
fair	  procedural	  safeguards	  are	  put	  in	  place	  (Tietje	  &	  Baetens,	  2014).	  	  
	  
There	  was	  a	  lot	  of	  protest	  against	  the	  aforementioned	  ISDS	  mechanism	  in	  the	  TTIP.	  The	  protesters	  claimed	  that	  
the	  ISDS	  system	  will	  lead	  to	  deteriorating	  labour	  laws	  and	  a	  decline	  of	  social	  rights	  juxtaposed	  with	  an	  even	  
stronger	  position	  for	  big	  companies.	  The	  EU	  negotiators	  heard	  the	  cry	  of	  the	  protesters	  and	  decided	  to	  give	  up	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the	  ISDS	  despite	  it	  being	  one	  of	  the	  initial	  cornerstones	  of	  the	  draft	  agreement.	  It	  was	  Jean-­‐Claude	  Juncker	  who	  
decided	  to	  take	  out	  the	  ISDS	  once	  and	  for	  all,	  stating:	  
	  
I	  don’t	  understand	  why	  great	  democracies	  would	  not	  have	  faith	  in	  the	  judiciary.	  We	  have	  courts	  which	  are	  able	  
to	  deal	  with	  cases	  that	  are	  brought	  to	  them,	  and	  so	  I’m	  not	  really	  in	  favour	  of	  what	  one	  could	  call	  “private	  
courts”	  or	  arbitration	  bodies	  which	  may	  sometimes	  reach	  good	  decisions	  but	  don’t	  always	  have	  to	  justify	  their	  
decisions.”-­‐	  Jean-­‐Claude	  Juncker	  at	  the	  Green	  Group	  hearing	  in	  July	  
	  
Nevertheless,	  Trade	  Commissioner	  Karel	  De	  Gucht	  had	  stated	  firmly	  "there	  will	  be	  no	  TTIP	  without	  an	  ISDS"	  just	  
a	  mere	  24	  hours	  before	  (McKeagney,	  2014).	  In	  an	  open	  letter	  to	  the	  Financial	  Times,	  Bernadette	  Ségol,	  General	  
Secretary	  of	  the	  European	  Trade	  Union	  Confederation,	  supported	  Juncker’s	  side	  and	  wrote	  that	  the	  ‘TTIP	  will	  
not	  be	  approved	  unless	  ISDS	  is	  dropped’	  (Ségol,	  27/10/2014).This	  shows	  that	  there	  is	  disagreement	  within	  the	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2. The	  WTO	  and	  Regionalism	  	  
2.1. Initial	  aversion	  towards	  RTAs	  
	  
RTAs	  have	  been	  shaping	  world	  trade	  long	  before	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  General	  Agreement	  on	  Tariffs	  and	  Trade	  
(GATT)	  in	  1947.	  The	  GATT	  has	  therefore	  been	  formed	  with	  both	  acknowledgement	  and	  apprehension	  of	  RTAs.	  
For	  the	  latter	  half	  of	  the	  20th	  century,	  RTAs	  contained	  mainly,	  or	  even	  exclusively,	  preferential	  tariff	  reduction 
(Narlikar, Daunton, & M. Stern, 2012).	  	  
	  
The	  WTO	  is	  the	  symbol	  of	  a	  globalised	  economy	  in	  a	  multilateral	  trading	  system.	  Bhagwati	  defines	  ‘economic	  
globalisation’	  as	  “the	  integration	  of	  national	  economies	  into	  the	  international	  economy	  through	  trade,	  direct	  
foreign	  investment	  (by	  corporations	  and	  multinationals),	  short	  term	  capital	  flows,	  international	  flows	  of	  
workers	  and	  humanity	  generally,	  and	  flows	  of	  technology” (Bhagwati & Jagdish, 2007).	  	  
	  
Even	  though	  the	  GATT	  of	  1947	  contained	  art.	  XXIV	  GATT,	  it	  seemed	  like	  it	  has	  been	  created	  to	  control	  rather	  
than	  condone	  the	  existence	  and	  formation	  of	  RTAs.	  The	  world	  economy	  in	  the	  1950’s	  was	  very	  different	  from	  
the	  global	  economy	  now	  and	  as	  it	  evolved,	  so	  did	  the	  WTO’s	  stance	  on	  the	  matter.	  And	  luckily	  so	  for	  ‘il	  n’y	  a	  
que	  les	  imbéciles	  qui	  ne	  changent	  pas	  d’avis.’1.	  
	  
As	  mentioned	  before,	  there	  was	  a	  surge	  of	  RTAs	  during	  the	  Uruguay	  round	  because	  of	  lack	  of	  trust	  in	  the	  
negotiations.	  A	  lot	  of	  policymakers	  and	  scholars	  predicted	  that	  RTAs	  would	  naturally	  decrease	  if	  the	  creation	  of	  
the	  WTO	  system	  were	  successful.	  An	  important	  scholar,	  John	  Jackson,	  predicted	  that	  “as	  the	  general	  incidence	  
of	  all	  tariff	  and	  other	  trade	  barriers	  declined	  worldwide,	  assuming	  the	  trend	  of	  the	  past	  twenty	  rears	  continues,	  
the	  problem	  of	  preferential	  arrangements	  may	  fade	  away”	  (Jackson,	  1969).	  	  Needless	  to	  say,	  they	  were	  wrong.	  
The	  question	  then	  becomes	  why	  are	  RTAs	  still	  being	  formed	  on	  a	  big	  scale	  despite	  the	  success	  of	  the	  WTO?	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  French	  proverb	  :	  Only	  fools	  never	  change	  their	  mind.	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The	  simultaneous	  proliferation	  of	  RTAs,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  development	  of	  the	  WTO’s	  multilateral	  
trading	  system,	  on	  the	  other,	  appear	  paradoxical	  at	  first.	  The	  WTO’s	  cornerstone	  is	  non-­‐discrimination	  whilst	  
RTAs	  are	  per	  se	  discriminatory.	  And	  yet,	  the	  RTAs	  are	  allowed	  to	  survive	  by	  the	  WTO,	  given	  they	  meet	  the	  
requirements	  set	  out	  by	  the	  WTO’s	  agreements.	  	  
	  
2.2. The	  non-­‐discrimination	  principle	  
One	  of	  the	  most	  important	  WTO	  principles	  is	  ‘non-­‐discrimination’.	  There	  are	  two	  sides	  to	  this	  principle;	  on	  one	  
hand	  there	  is	  the	  Most	  Favourite	  Nation	  or	  MFN	  principle,	  and	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  there	  is	  the	  principle	  of	  
National	  treatment.	  	  
	  
2.2.1. Most-­‐favoured	  Nations	  
	  
The	  MFN	  principle	  is	  an	  outing	  of	  the	  non-­‐discrimination	  principle	  as	  described	  by	  Art.	  I	  of	  the	  GATT:	  	  
	  
“With	  respect	  to	  customs	  duties	  and	  charges	  of	  any	  kind	  imposed	  on	  or	  in	  connection	  with	  importation	  or	  
exportation	  (…)	  any	  advantage,	  favour,	  privilege	  or	  immunity	  granted	  by	  any	  contracting	  party	  to	  any	  product	  
originating	  in	  or	  destined	  for	  any	  other	  country	  shall	  be	  accorded	  immediately	  and	  unconditionally	  to	  the	  like	  
product	  originating	  in	  or	  destined	  for	  the	  territories	  of	  all	  other	  contracting	  parties.”	  –	  Article	  I,	  paragraph	  1	  
GATT	  
	  
	  Art	  XXIV	  puts	  forward	  the	  requirements	  that	  RTAs	  have	  to	  meet	  in	  order	  to	  be	  compliant	  with	  WTO	  law.	  It	  is	  
the	  WTO’s	  legitimate	  concern	  to	  keep	  the	  reigns	  on	  RTAs	  since	  a	  complete	  carte	  blanche	  might	  damage	  the	  
multilateral	  trading	  system.	  	  
Art	  XXIV	  wording	  is	  not	  always	  clear	  and	  this	  leads	  to	  disputes	  about	  its	  interpretation.	  The	  
	  
Art.	  I	  GATT	  enshrines	  this	  concept	  of	  Most-­‐Favoured	  Nation	  clause	  and	  is	  seen	  as	  one	  of	  the	  tools	  paramount	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to	  liberalise	  trade.	  Concerning	  services,	  MFN	  is	  defined	  in	  Art.	  II	  GATS	  and	  for	  intellectual	  property	  we	  can	  find	  
the	  concept	  in	  Art.	  IV	  TRIPS.	  Art.	  I	  GATT	  reads	  as	  follows:	  
“[...]any	  advantage,	  favour,	  privilege	  or	  immunity	  granted	  by	  any	  contracting	  party	  to	  any	  product	  originating	  in	  
or	  destined	  for	  any	  other	  country	  shall	  be	  accorded	  immediately	  and	  unconditionally	  to	  the	  like	  product	  
originating	  in	  or	  destined	  for	  the	  territories	  of	  all	  other	  contracting	  parties.”	  
	  
Global	  competitive	  free	  trade	  is	  seen	  by	  most	  scholars	  as	  not	  being	  subject	  to	  the	  Pareto	  theorem.	  If	  the	  
market	  equilibrium	  is	  in	  the	  Pareto	  optimum	  then	  the	  welfare	  of	  one	  single	  player	  will	  negatively	  affect	  the	  
wellfare	  of	  the	  other	  meaning	  that	  the	  resources	  are	  finite.	  Most	  recent	  studies (Bagwell & Steiger, 2002) 
(Grandmont & McFadden, 1975)	  however	  have	  shown	  that	  trade	  liberalisation	  is	  not	  a	  zero	  sum	  game2.	  	  
	  
These	  studies	  show	  why	  MFN	  is	  important	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  promote	  trade	  liberisation	  and	  prevent	  a	  Prisoner’s	  
Dilemma.	  Art.	  I,	  1	  GATT	  states	  that	  WTO	  Members	  have	  to	  apply	  their	  customs	  duties	  in	  a	  non-­‐discriminatory	  
way.	  Concretely,	  if	  country	  A	  gives	  a	  tariff	  reduction	  to	  country	  B	  for,	  for	  example	  cars,	  it	  must,	  immediately,	  do	  
so	  as	  well	  for	  cars	  coming	  from	  countries	  C,	  D,...and	  Z.	  	  
	  
The	  MFN	  clause	  is	  applicable	  to	  both	  the	  same	  and	  all	  ‘like’	  products	  as	  stated	  in	  art.	  I	  GATT (Horn & 
Mavroidis, 2013).	  	  Unfortunately,	  this	  the	  term	  ‘like	  product’	  is	  not	  easily	  interpreted	  and	  the	  GATT	  show	  a	  
vacuum	  on	  the	  interpretation.	  Jurisprudence	  has	  taken	  this	  concept	  under	  the	  loop	  and	  in	  the	  EEC-­‐Animal	  Feed	  
Proteins3 (L/4599, 1978)	  it	  suggest	  that	  a	  narrow	  interpretation	  should	  be	  given	  to	  the	  concept	  ‘like’	  since	  it	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  in	  favour	  of	  Pareto	  optimum:	  Grandmont,	  J.-­‐M.	  &	  McFadden,	  D.,	  ‘A	  Technical	  Note	  on	  Classical	  Gains	  from	  
Trade’,	  Journal	  of	  International	  economics,	  1975,	  2:109-­‐125	  
the	  Pareto	  optimum	  is	  not	  applicable	  to	  global	  trade:	  Bagwell,	  K.	  &	  Steiger,	  R.,	  The	  Economics	  of	  the	  World	  
Trading	  System,	  MIT	  Press,	  2002 
3 EEC-Measures on Animal Feed Proteins(GATT Doc L/4599, panel report adopted on 14 March 1978) 
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does	  not	  mean	  ‘directly	  substitutable	  product’	  but	  a	  more	  identical	  product (Matsushita, Schoenbaum, & 
Mavriodis, 2006).	  	  
	  
There	  are	  exceptions	  to	  MFN,	  which	  shows	  that	  this	  principle	  is	  not	  sacrosanct.	  The	  exceptions	  to	  MFN	  
principle	  are	  elaborated	  under	  chapter	  2.4.	  	  
	  
2.2.2. National	  treatment	  	  
	  
The	  second	  way	  the	  non-­‐discrimination	  presents	  itself	  is	  by	  the	  principle	  of	  national	  treatment.	  This	  WTO	  
principle	  is	  intimitely	  interlinked	  with	  MFN	  being	  its	  national	  complement.	  National	  treatment	  is	  stated	  in	  Art.	  
III	  GATT	  for	  goods,	  in	  Art.	  XVII	  GATS	  for	  services	  and	  in	  Art.	  III	  of	  the	  TRIPS	  for	  copyrights,	  patents	  and	  
trademarks.	  These	  articles	  proscribe	  that	  both	  locally	  produced	  goods/patents/services	  and	  imported	  
goods/patents/services	  should	  be	  treated	  equally	  after	  the	  imported	  goods	  entered	  the	  national	  market.	  It	  is	  
the	  second	  non-­‐discrimination	  clause	  in	  the	  WTO’s	  legal	  texts	  and	  obliges	  parties	  to	  give	  the	  same	  treatment	  to	  
others	  as	  to	  ones	  own	  nationals (WTO-website).	  
	  
A	  well-­‐known	  case	  for	  the	  WTO’s	  Dispute	  Settlement	  Body	  was	  the	  Japan-­‐Alcoholic	  beverages	  II	  case 
(DISPUTE-DS8, 1996).	  In	  this	  case,	  Japan	  taxed	  vodka	  and	  whiskey	  seven	  times	  higher	  than	  their	  own	  locally	  
produced	  ‘like’	  product	  sake.	  Japan	  tried	  to	  justify	  the	  difference	  in	  taxation	  by	  claiming	  that	  their	  customers	  
like	  sake	  more	  than	  the	  other	  to	  and	  to	  prove	  they	  came	  up	  with	  the	  statistics	  of	  sold	  bottles	  per	  each	  
category.	  	  Of	  course,	  if	  one	  drink	  is	  significantly	  more	  expensive,	  it	  is	  only	  natural	  the	  customer	  will	  take	  the	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2.3. 	  Changed	  attitude	  and	  the	  GATT	  1994	  
	  
The	  second	  sentence	  of	  the	  ‘Understanding	  of	  article	  XXIV	  of	  GATT	  ‘94’	  reads	  as	  follows:	  “Recognizing	  that	  
customs	  unions	  and	  free	  trade	  areas	  have	  greatly	  increased	  in	  number	  and	  importance	  since	  the	  establishment	  
of	  GATT	  1947	  and	  today	  cover	  a	  significant	  proportion	  of	  world	  trade;”	  
	  
The	  WTO	  acknowledges	  that	  there	  has	  been	  an	  evolution	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  world	  trade	  and	  RTAs	  since	  1947.	  It	  is	  
therefore	  important	  that	  the	  legal	  texts	  are	  interpreted	  in	  the	  new	  Zeitgeist	  in	  order	  not	  to	  become	  obsolete.	  
We	  have	  to	  interpret	  the	  law	  in	  light	  of	  the	  ratio	  legis	  and	  try	  to	  find	  its	  teleological	  explanation.	  	  With	  142	  of	  
its	  161	  members	  being	  part	  of	  at	  least	  one	  RTA,	  the	  WTO	  has	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  fact	  that	  RTAs	  are	  here	  to	  
stay.	  	  
	  
Article	  XXIV	  of	  the	  GATT	  states	  the	  exception	  to	  MFN	  for	  RTAs,	  or	  Free	  trade	  areas	  according	  to	  the	  GATT.	  
There	  has	  been	  a	  lot	  of	  criticism	  concerning	  the	  effectiveness	  and	  interpretation	  of	  this	  article.	  The	  GATT	  was	  
conceived	  in	  the	  post-­‐war	  period’s	  economic	  regime	  and	  has	  been	  interpreted	  by	  the	  WTO’s	  legal	  experts	  in	  
order	  to	  fit	  into	  today’s	  economic	  regime.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  its	  creation,	  the	  GATT	  drafters	  did	  not	  expect	  regions	  
to	  become	  such	  powerful	  players	  on	  the	  global	  economic	  stage.	  Some	  scholars	  proclaim	  that	  the	  discrepancy	  
between	  law	  and	  reality	  demands	  for	  a	  revision	  of	  the	  GATT	  article (Kodama, 2000).	  
	  
From	  the	  reading	  of	  article	  XXIV	  paragraph	  4	  we	  can	  deduct	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  article	  and	  consequently	  the	  way	  
in	  which	  it	  should	  be	  interpreted.	  
	  
	  “The	  contracting	  parties	  recognize	  the	  desirability	  of	  increasing	  freedom	  of	  trade	  by	  the	  development,	  through	  
voluntary	  agreements,	  of	  closer	  integration	  between	  the	  economies	  of	  the	  countries	  parties	  to	  such	  
agreements.	  They	  also	  recognize	  that	  the	  purpose	  of	  a	  customs	  union	  or	  of	  a	  free-­‐trade	  area	  should	  be	  to	  
facilitate	  trade	  between	  the	  constituent	  territories	  and	  not	  to	  raise	  barriers	  to	  the	  trade	  of	  other	  contracting	  
parties	  with	  such	  territories.”	  –	  paragraph	  4	  of	  article	  XXIV	  GATT	  
	  	  




The	  main	  objective	  of	  the	  article	  is	  clear.	  The	  GATT	  wanted	  to	  create	  an	  exception	  to	  MFN	  and	  at	  the	  same	  
time	  regulate	  the	  complex	  legal	  repercussions	  created	  by	  the	  discriminatory	  free	  trade	  areas.	  Article	  XXIV	  
contains	  a	  list	  of	  requirements	  the	  free	  trade	  area	  has	  to	  abide	  by	  in	  order	  to	  be	  a	  legal	  exception	  to	  MFN.	  
These	  requirements	  have	  been	  subject	  to	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  legal	  disputes	  before	  the	  WTO’s	  Dispute	  Settlement	  
Body	  (DSB).	  Most	  of	  these	  disputes	  concern	  the	  scope	  of	  these	  requirements,	  e.g.	  the	  scope	  of	  ‘substantially	  all	  
trade’	  in	  Turkey	  –	  Textiles	  and	  Canada	  -­‐	  Autos	  on	  article	  XXIV	  paragraph	  8.	  Therefore,	  it	  might	  be	  desireable	  to	  
provide	  a	  more	  detailed	  explanation	  of	  the	  provisions	  made	  by	  the	  article	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  more	  legal	  
security	  and	  less	  disputes.	  	  
	  
The	  WTO	  itself	  admits	  that	  RTAs	  are	  per	  se	  discriminatory	  because	  they	  form	  a	  de	  facto	  breach	  of	  	  the	  
multilateral	  trading	  system’s	  core	  value,	  the	  MFN	  principle.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  WTO	  also	  admits	  that	  RTAs	  
can	  be	  a	  building	  block	  and	  thereby	  complement	  the	  multilateral	  trading	  system	  and	  strengthen	  it.	  The	  WTO	  
has	  some	  reservations	  concerning	  the	  effects	  of	  RTAs	  on	  global	  trade	  liberalisation	  and	  also	  economic	  growth.	  
This	  is	  because	  the	  economic	  impact	  of	  RTAs	  is	  difficult	  to	  estimate	  beforehand.	  While	  the	  signatory	  countries	  
will	  benefit	  from	  the	  provisions	  in	  the	  RTA,	  there	  is	  the	  fear	  that	  these	  benefits	  will	  be	  less	  than	  expected	  
because	  of	  trade	  diversion,	  distorted	  resource	  allocation	  and	  investment	  diversion.	  The	  signatory	  countries	  
need	  to	  anticipate	  these	  potential	  threats	  so	  that	  they	  can	  be	  curtailed	  as	  much	  as	  possible.	  The	  WTO	  does	  
specify	  that	  the	  impact	  of	  an	  RTA	  depends	  on	  its	  nature.	  Depending	  on	  which	  parameters	  the	  member	  
countries	  set	  forth,	  the	  RTA	  can	  have	  a	  different	  effect	  on	  the	  economy.	  RTAs	  that	  allow	  deep	  trade	  
liberalisation	  and	  harmonisation,	  will	  have	  a	  larger	  economic	  impact	  according	  to	  the	  WTO.	  The	  WTO	  also	  
supports	  the	  claim	  that	  in	  case	  simultaneous	  RTAs	  are	  both	  promoting	  MFN-­‐based	  trade	  liberalisation,	  whether	  
it	  be	  unilateral	  or	  multilateral,	  they	  can	  reduce	  both	  regional	  and	  global	  trade	  distortions (WTO).	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2.4. Exceptions	  to	  the	  non-­‐discrimination	  principle	  
2.4.1. Article	  XXIV	  GATT	  	  
	  
In	  order	  to	  control	  RTAs	  the	  WTO	  created	  article	  XXIV	  GATT	  that	  is	  applicable	  to	  customs	  unions	  and	  free	  trade	  
areas	  (FTAs)	  for	  trade	  in	  goods.	  This	  article	  serves	  two	  major	  purposes.	  Firstly,	  the	  requirements	  set	  forth	  by	  
article	  XXIV	  GATT	  are	  designed	  to	  limit	  the	  negative	  effects	  caused	  by	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  RTA	  to	  non-­‐parties	  to	  
that	  RTA.	  Secondly,	  the	  parties	  to	  the	  RTAs	  themselves	  do	  not	  discriminate.	  The	  WTO	  allows	  the	  creation	  of	  
FTAs	  when	  they	  facilitate	  trade	  among	  its	  parties	  without	  raising	  barriers	  to	  the	  trade	  of	  other	  WTO	  members.	  
The	  second	  requirement	  is	  that	  customs	  duties	  and	  other	  restrictive	  regulations	  of	  trade	  have	  to	  be	  eliminated	  
vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  “substantially	  all	  trade”	  between	  the	  parties	  to	  the	  FTA.	  The	  same	  goes	  for	  customs	  union,	  but	  with	  
one	  more	  requirement	  added;	  that	  “substantially	  the	  same	  duties	  and	  other	  regulations	  of	  commerce”	  must	  be	  
applicable	  to	  every	  member	  of	  the	  customs	  union	  (Sampson, 2003).	  
	  
Because	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  transparancy	  in	  the	  wording	  of	  art.	  XXIV	  GATT,	  the	  lawmakers	  of	  the	  WTO	  had	  to	  come	  
up	  with	  the	  “Understanding	  on	  the	  Interpretation	  of	  Article	  XXIV	  of	  the	  GATT	  1994”.	  
	  
2.4.2. Article	  V	  GATS	  
	  
Art.	  V	  GATS	  on	  economic	  integration	  contains	  similar	  yet	  slighty	  different	  requirements	  as	  art.	  XXIV	  GATS.	  As	  
opposed	  to	  article	  XXIV	  GATT	  the	  creators	  of	  the	  GATS	  article	  did	  not	  find	  it	  necessary	  to	  distinguish	  between	  
customs	  unions	  and	  FTAs.	  This	  article	  focusses	  on	  RTAs	  that	  contain	  services	  and	  allows	  for	  exceptions	  to	  MFN	  
to	  be	  made	  by	  ‘integration	  areements’	  (sic).	  One	  of	  the	  requirements	  that	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  GATT	  is	  that	  the	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2.4.3. Enabling	  Clause	  
	  
The ‘Decision	  on	  Differential	  and	  More	  Favourable	  Treatment,	  Reciprocity	  and	  Fuller	  Participation	  of	  
Developing	  Countries’,	  or	  in	  short	  the	  ‘Enabling	  Clause’.	  The	  Enabling	  Clause	  is	  a	  ‘special	  and	  differential	  
treatment	  provision’	  consacrated	  in	  the	  GATT	  1994.	  This	  clause	  allows	  for	  developed	  countries	  to	  lower	  trade	  
barriers	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  developing	  countries	  without	  the	  obligation	  to	  lower	  tarrifs	  towards	  other	  developed	  
countries.	  For	  example:	  If	  the	  Netherlands	  lower	  the	  tariff	  on	  beans	  coming	  from	  Nigeria	  it	  does	  not	  have	  to	  do	  
so	  for	  beans	  coming	  from	  France.	  Another	  exception	  to	  MFN,	  and	  for	  this	  paper	  a	  more	  pertinent	  one,	  is	  the	  
exception	  for	  free	  trade	  areas	  provided	  for	  in	  art.	  XXIV	  GATT	  and	  art.	  V	  GATS	  on	  condition	  that	  certain	  strict	  
requirements	  are	  met. 	  
	  
2.4.4. (TOO	  much)	  Room	  for	  manoeuvre	  
	  
Except	  for	  these	  three	  provisions,	  the	  WTO	  leaves	  us	  in	  the	  dark	  about	  which	  types	  of	  commitments	  in	  RTAs	  
are	  WTO	  compatible.	  This	  lack	  of	  clarity	  concerning	  other	  regulatory	  trade	  issues	  and	  trade-­‐related	  policy	  areas	  
leaves	  RTA	  drafters	  with	  ample	  room	  for	  manoeuvre.	  In	  case	  States	  want	  to	  include	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  
and	  government	  procurement	  into	  their	  RTA,	  they	  will	  find	  not	  even	  one	  WTO	  provision	  about	  what	  measures	  
they	  can	  take	  or	  not	  take.	  If	  the	  WTO	  does	  not	  provide	  any	  restrictive	  provision,	  states	  are	  left	  free	  to	  pursue	  
any	  kind	  of	  agenda	  or	  regional	  trade	  policy	  they	  fancy	  leading	  to	  a	  plethora	  of	  distinct	  RTAs	  with	  different	  levels	  
of	  integration (Reiter, 2003).	  
	  
Adding	  a	  tad	  more	  clarity	  to	  the	  provisions	  would	  be	  better	  for	  the	  WTO	  since	  we	  do	  not	  yet	  know	  the	  
economic	  impact	  of	  ‘deep	  integration’	  RTAs.	  The	  debate	  of	  whether	  they	  form	  stumbling	  blocs	  or	  building	  
blocks	  is	  fervently	  being	  held	  without	  any	  real	  conclusive	  effect (Reiter, 2003).	  Nevertheless,	  in	  this	  thesis	  I	  
adhere	  to	  the	  building	  blocks	  camp	  because	  their	  cautious	  calculations	  and	  analysis	  lead	  to	  that	  conslusion.	  
Despite	  being	  a	  supportor	  of	  the	  building	  block-­‐these,	  we	  must	  not	  turn	  a	  deaf	  ear	  to	  our	  adversaries	  and	  their	  
comments	  about	  the	  potential	  difficulties	  arising	  from	  deep	  integration	  RTAs.	  As	  I	  will	  discuss	  later	  on,	  RTAs	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that	  pursue	  ‘deep	  integration’,	  i.e.	  regulatory	  integration,	  will	  not	  only	  have	  an	  economic	  impact;	  they	  will	  also	  
have	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  compatibility	  of	  different	  regulatory	  frameworks.	  The	  WTO (1995)	  refers	  to	  this	  problem	  
as	  ‘institutional	  complementarity’.	  The	  question	  is	  whether	  the	  regulatory	  policies	  created	  by	  RTAs	  will	  hinder	  
or	  facilitate	  the	  creating	  of	  new	  WTO	  regulations	  on	  that	  same	  issue.	  If	  RTAs	  create	  divergent	  regulatory	  
provisions	  concerning	  policy	  areas	  that	  are	  untrodden	  surface	  for	  the	  WTO,	  it	  might	  lead	  to	  difficulties	  when	  
this	  issue	  is	  brought	  to	  the	  multilateral	  negiotiation	  table.	  In	  this	  scenario,	  where	  pre-­‐existing	  divergent	  RTA	  
regulations	  form	  an	  obstacle	  for	  the	  succes	  on	  the	  multilateral	  level,	  the	  RTAs	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  stumbling	  block.	  	  
	  
2.5. 	  Principles	  of	  the	  WTO	  
	  
The	  WTO	  is	  a	  member-­‐driven	  global	  international	  organisation	  with	  legal	  personality	  and	  capacity.	  On	  the	  
WTO’s	  website	  we	  can	  see	  the	  following	  disclaimer	  appear	  in	  the	  bottom	  left	  corner:	  	  
	  
“The	  World	  Trade	  Organization	  (WTO)	  deals	  with	  the	  global	  rules	  of	  trade	  between	  nations.	  Its	  main	  function	  is	  
to	  ensure	  that	  trade	  flows	  as	  smoothly,	  predictably	  and	  freely	  as	  possible.”	  -­‐	  ©	  World	  Trade	  Organization	  2014	  
Disclaimer	  
	  
This	  is	  the	  original	  purely	  economic	  liberalist	  aim	  for	  which	  the	  WTO	  was	  founded.	  I	  do	  remember	  however,	  
that	  some	  time	  ago,	  the	  disclaimer	  also	  mentioned	  development.	  The	  goal	  of	  the	  WTO	  can	  be	  found	  on	  the	  
website	  as	  well.	  
	  
“The	  result	  is	  assurance.	  Consumers	  and	  producers	  know	  that	  they	  can	  enjoy	  secure	  supplies	  and	  greater	  choice	  
of	  the	  finished	  products,	  components,	  raw	  materials	  and	  services	  that	  they	  use.	  Producers	  and	  exporters	  know	  
that	  foreign	  markets	  will	  remain	  open	  to	  them.”	  	  -­‐www.wto.org	  
	  
This	  is	  the	  economic	  goal	  and	  as	  I	  mentioned	  before,	  a	  purely	  economist	  liberalist	  view.	  As	  we	  read	  further	  we	  
can	  also	  find	  that	  the	  WTO	  is	  also	  striving	  for	  more	  development	  for	  developing	  countries	  as	  an	  interlinked	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consequence	  of	  responsible	  trade	  liberisation.	  By	  ensuring	  a	  more	  economically	  balanced	  world	  with	  a	  binding	  
dispute	  settlement	  system	  the	  WTO	  aims	  at	  a	  more	  stable	  political	  world	  as	  well.	  The	  former	  wars	  have	  shown	  
us	  that	  disputes	  tend	  to	  escalate	  after	  severe	  economic	  sanctions	  are	  imposed	  unilaterelly.	  
	  
“The	  result	  is	  also	  a	  more	  prosperous,	  peaceful	  and	  accountable	  economic	  world.	  [...]That	  way,	  the	  risk	  of	  
disputes	  spilling	  over	  into	  political	  or	  military	  conflict	  is	  reduced.	  By	  lowering	  trade	  barriers,	  the	  WTO’s	  system	  
also	  breaks	  down	  other	  barriers	  between	  peoples	  and	  nations.”	  
	  
The	  WTO	  sets	  forth	  a	  few	  basic	  principles,	  which	  it	  wants	  the	  international	  community	  to	  abide	  by.	  If	  an	  RTA	  
wants	  to	  make	  sure	  it	  does	  not	  impede	  the	  multilateral	  trading	  system	  then,	  logically	  speaking,	  it	  must	  try	  not	  
to	  go	  against	  these	  principles	  directly.	  We	  will	  list	  the	  principles	  and	  give	  a	  short	  summary	  how	  they	  work	  and	  
are	  implemented.	  These	  principles	  form	  the	  backbone	  of	  the	  WTO	  and	  its	  philosophy.	  That	  is	  why	  we	  need	  to	  
keep	  them	  in	  mind	  when	  studying	  the	  TTIP.	  
	  
2.5.1. The	  Trading	  system	  should	  be	  without	  discrimination	  
	  
A	  WTO	  member	  should	  not	  discriminate	  against	  other	  members	  or	  between	  its	  own	  and	  foreign	  products,	  
services	  or	  nationals.	  In	  WTO	  parlance,	  the	  trading	  partners	  in	  the	  WTO	  system	  have	  to	  give	  each	  other	  MFN	  
status	  and	  national	  treatment.	  Even	  thoug	  an	  RTA	  is	  per	  se	  discriminatory	  against	  some	  of	  its	  trading	  partners,	  
the	  WTO	  itself	  provided	  an	  exemption	  for	  the	  RTAs.	  
2.5.2. A	  freer	  market	  
	  
It	  is	  the	  WTO’s	  aim	  to	  tear	  down	  trade	  barriers	  by	  negotiation.	  The	  WTO	  has	  a	  very	  broad	  understanding	  of	  
what	  trade	  barriers	  are.	  They	  do	  not	  only	  include	  direct	  tariffs	  on	  import	  or	  export,	  but	  also	  indirect	  trade	  
barriers	  such	  as	  safety	  or	  health	  regulations.	  	  
	  
An	  RTA	  can	  lead	  to	  a	  freer	  market	  because	  they	  liberalise	  beyond	  the	  WTO’s	  requirements,	  while	  at	  the	  same	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time,	  not	  raising	  barriers	  to	  non-­‐members	  to	  the	  RTA	  in	  question.	  The	  currently	  applied	  tariffs	  between	  the	  EU	  
and	  US	  are	  already	  so	  minimal	  that	  complete	  tariff	  eradication	  will	  not	  have	  a	  great	  economic	  impact.	  The	  
TTIP’s	  main	  aim,	  therefore,	  is	  to	  eradicate	  the	  non-­‐trade	  barriers,	  more	  specifically	  regulatory	  barriers,	  
between	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  US.	  (Freytag,	  Draper,	  &	  Fricke,	  2014).	  This	  will	  allow	  the	  markets	  to	  open	  up	  more	  to	  




The	  WTO	  envisions	  a	  world	  where	  governments,	  foreign	  investors	  and	  companies	  should	  not	  fear	  arbitrarily	  
raised	  trade	  barriers.	  The	  WTO	  guards	  over	  this	  principle	  by	  ensuring	  that	  the	  member	  states	  are	  bound	  by	  
tariff	  limitations	  and	  committed	  to	  opening	  up	  their	  market.	  	  
	  
2.5.4. More	  competition	  
	  
The	  WTO	  directly	  forbids	  unfair	  practices	  like	  export	  subsidies	  and	  dumping.	  This	  is	  especially	  important	  for	  
developing	  countries	  that	  sometimes	  get	  confronted	  with	  dumping	  practices	  coming	  from	  the	  developed	  
countries.	  The	  WTO’s	  	  anti-­‐dumping	  regulations	  form	  a	  good	  safeguard	  for	  the	  developing	  countries.	  
	  
2.5.5. Member-­‐driven,	  one-­‐country-­‐one-­‐vote	  decisionmaking	  
	  
Even	  though	  de	  iure	  decisionmaking	  in	  the	  WTO	  is	  based	  on	  the	  “one-­‐country,	  one-­‐vote”	  principle,	  de	  facto	  the	  
members	  decide	  by	  consensus	  and	  thus	  the	  prime	  movers,	  the	  US	  and	  the	  EU,	  hold	  a	  lot	  of	  power.	  They	  wield	  
their	  power	  in	  the	  informal	  cabinets	  of	  the	  WTO,	  the	  so-­‐called	  Green	  Room	  meetings.	  These	  informal	  Green	  
Room	  meetings	  are	  preceded	  by	  the	  Director-­‐General	  as	  the	  chairman	  and	  he	  invites	  only	  the	  members	  who	  
actively	  show	  an	  interest	  in	  a	  certain	  trade	  issue (WTO website).	  As	  the	  two	  most	  pro-­‐active	  members	  and	  
global	  economies,	  the	  EU	  and	  US	  are	  always	  present	  at	  these	  meetings,	  meaning	  that	  they	  have	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  
	  	  
	   Regionalisation	  withing	  the	  context	  of	  the	  WTO:	  A	  case-­‐study	  of	  the	  TTIP	   	  	   	  
16	  
influence	  in	  the	  policy-­‐making	  processess	  and	  effectively	  mangage	  the	  WTO.	  Another	  way,	  in	  which	  the	  EU	  and	  
US	  control	  the	  multilateral	  trading	  system,	  is	  via	  the	  WTO	  budget.	  Decisionmaking	  by	  consensus	  is	  the	  de	  facto	  
rule,	  but	  every	  state	  has	  its	  veto	  and	  this	  is	  how	  the	  large	  countries	  influence	  the	  decisionmaking	  process.	  Since	  
the	  EU	  and	  the	  US	  contribute	  respectively	  42%	  and	  16%	  to	  the	  WTO’s	  budget	  annually,	  they	  effectively	  control	  
its	  the	  size	  and	  composition.	  The	  result	  is	  that,	  while	  the	  WTO	  is	  a	  ‘member-­‐driven	  organisation’,	  some	  
countries	  clearly	  take	  the	  driving	  wheel	  into	  their	  own	  hands	  and	  decide	  the	  route.	  Smaller	  countries	  are	  
disadvantaged	  in	  case	  the	  WTO	  Secretariat	  becomes	  understaffed	  due	  to	  budgetshortages.	  The	  EU	  and	  US	  
have	  their	  own	  professional	  staff	  to	  handle	  their	  trade	  issues	  in	  international	  trade,	  but	  the	  smaller	  and	  poorer	  
states	  lack	  the	  resources	  to	  employ	  these	  high	  professionals	  and	  are	  dependent	  on	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  WTO	  
staff,	  and	  thus	  indirectly	  dependent	  on	  the	  EU	  and	  US’	  contribution	  to	  the	  WTO	  (Wijkman,	  2003).	  
	  
	  
2.6. How	  does	  the	  TTIP	  fit	  into	  the	  WTO	  framework	  	  
2.6.1. Open	  regionalism	  	  
	  
Regionalism	  can	  be	  either	  open	  or	  closed.	  In	  order	  to	  be	  considered	  as	  beneficial	  for	  globalisation,	  liberal	  
economists	  require	  the	  RTA	  to	  be	  ‘open’	  meaning	  targeted	  at	  integrating	  other	  participating	  nonmember	  
states.	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  of	  the	  spectrum	  are	  the	  ‘closed’	  RTAs	  that	  try	  to	  curb	  the	  effects	  of	  globalisation	  in	  a	  
way	  to	  protect	  their	  own	  economy (Nesadurai, 2002).	  The	  first	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  result	  of	  the	  current	  
globalisation	  process,	  the	  latter	  a	  response	  against	  it. (Dees, di Mauro, & J. McKibbin, 2008)	  
	  
2.6.2. Deep	  integration	  	  
	  
Deep	  integration	  goes	  beyond	  mere	  tariff	  reduction.	  The	  European	  Union	  is	  a	  good	  example	  of	  deep	  
integration.	  Deep	  integration	  can	  consist	  of	  standard	  harmonisation,	  investor	  protection	  and	  regulations	  and	  
other	  measures	  to	  eliminate	  non-­‐tariff	  barriers	  like	  the	  TTIP	  aims	  to	  do.	  The	  WTO	  has	  thusfar	  not	  been	  able	  to	  
	  	  
	   Regionalisation	  withing	  the	  context	  of	  the	  WTO:	  A	  case-­‐study	  of	  the	  TTIP	   	  	   	  
17	  
do	  so	  and	  its	  members	  will	  likely	  be	  opposed	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  multilateral	  deep	  integration	  at	  this	  point	  of	  time	  
because	  it	  might	  endanger	  their	  sovereignty.	  The	  TTIP	  integrates	  on	  a	  level	  that	  it	  is	  higher	  than	  that	  of	  WTO	  
integration	  and	  is	  therefore	  no	  impedement	  or	  parallel	  agreement	  to	  the	  WTO	  rules.	  Later	  on	  under	  point	  3.6	  I	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3. The	  evolution	  of	  Regionalism	  Chapter	  	  
3.1. Different	  levels	  of	  regionalism	  	  
	  
Economists	  differentiate	  between	  five	  different	  stages	  or	  levels	  of	  regional	  integration.	  These	  different	  models	  
do	  not	  do	  justice	  to	  the	  colourful	  spectrum	  that	  is	  reality,	  they	  form	  a	  mere	  guidance	  to	  help	  us	  understand	  
and	  classify	  RTAs.	  At	  the	  least	  integrated	  level	  there	  is	  the	  ‘Free	  Trade	  Area’	  where	  member	  states	  eliminate	  
tariffs	  and	  other	  trade	  restrictions	  on	  substantially	  all	  trade	  between	  each	  other,	  but	  each	  member	  keeps	  its	  
autonomy	  regarding	  trade	  policies	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  nonmember	  states.	  Member	  states	  of	  a	  Free	  Trade	  Area	  do	  not	  
need	  to	  sacrifice	  their	  national	  sovereignty,	  making	  it	  an	  interesting	  tool	  for	  states	  with	  sensitive	  political	  ties.	  
The	  North	  American	  Free	  Trade	  Agreement	  (NAFTA)	  is	  an	  example	  of	  a	  free	  trade	  area.	  On	  a	  second	  level	  we	  
find	  the	  Customs	  Union	  (CU),	  which	  has	  the	  same	  elements	  as	  the	  free	  trade	  area,	  plus	  a	  common	  external	  
tariff	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  nonmembers.	  	  CU	  members	  give	  up	  part	  of	  their	  sovereignty	  to	  institutions	  that	  monitor	  the	  
common	  tariff.	  The	  European	  Union	  (EU)	  is	  an	  example	  of	  a	  CU.	  The	  third	  level	  of	  integration	  concerns	  the	  
creation	  of	  a	  Common	  Market,	  which	  has	  the	  same	  principles	  as	  the	  CU,	  plus	  free	  traffic	  of	  production	  factors	  
like	  labour	  and	  capital.	  The	  free	  traffic	  of	  labour	  gives	  the	  members	  an	  incentive	  to	  attune	  their	  health,	  safety	  
and	  social	  security	  standards	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  other	  memberstates'	  workers	  from	  having	  a	  competitive	  
advantage.	  The	  EU	  is	  currently	  one	  of	  the	  rare	  examples	  of	  a	  common	  market.	  The	  fourth	  level	  is	  that	  of	  the	  
Economic	  Union,	  which	  has	  all	  of	  the	  characteristics	  of	  a	  common	  market,	  but	  it	  also	  harmonises	  members’	  
industrial,	  transport,	  fiscal,	  regional	  and	  monetary	  policies.	  The	  16	  EU	  members	  that	  joined	  the	  Economic	  and	  
Monetary	  Union	  (EMU)	  with	  the	  euro	  as	  their	  common	  currency	  form	  an	  example	  of	  an	  Economic	  Union.	  
Finally,	  there	  is	  the	  most	  integrated	  level,	  the	  Political	  union.	  A	  political	  union	  is	  an	  economic	  union	  with	  
harmonised	  foreign	  and	  defence	  policies	  for	  its	  members (Cohn, 2012).	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3.2. Liberalist	  Point	  of	  view	  
	  
According	  to	  Cohn	  liberal	  economists	  regard	  multilateralism	  as	  the	  best	  possible	  route	  to	  freer	  trade	  as	  it	  
eliminates	  both	  regional	  and	  national	  barriers.	  The	  liberals	  do	  support	  open	  RTAs	  because	  they	  consider	  them	  
to	  be	  the	  second	  best	  route	  to	  liberalisation	  in	  case	  multilateral	  trade	  negotiations	  fail.	  Closed	  RTAs	  that	  put	  up	  
more	  trade	  barriers	  and	  create	  more	  trade	  diversion	  than	  trade	  creation	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  are	  considered	  to	  
be	  a	  threat	  to	  global	  trade	  liberalisation	  by	  the	  liberals	  (Cohn,	  2012,	  p.	  p.	  211).	  Whether	  or	  not	  RTAs	  are	  a	  
stepping-­‐stone	  for	  globalisation	  is	  a	  debate	  mainly	  amongst	  liberal	  economists.	  	  
	  
Liberal	  thinkers	  prefer	  multilateralism	  as	  the	  ideal	  way	  towards	  global	  trade	  liberalisation.	  Open	  regionalism	  is	  
considered	  to	  be	  the	  runner-­‐up	  in	  achieving	  this	  goal	  as	  they	  can	  lead	  to	  what	  Jacob	  Viner	  (Viner	  1950)	  calls	  
trade	  diversion,	  i.e.	  when	  trade	  is	  diverted	  from	  more	  efficient	  non-­‐member	  exporters	  or	  importers	  to	  less	  
efficient	  RTA-­‐member	  exporters	  or	  importers.	  Usually	  an	  RTA	  will	  create	  some	  trade	  diversion,	  but	  it	  has	  to	  be	  
less	  than	  the	  trade	  it	  creates	  so	  the	  balance	  will	  be	  positive	  in	  the	  end.	  	  
	  
The	  camp	  of	  the	  liberals	  is	  divided	  in	  this	  matter;	  some	  believe	  that	  RTAs	  form	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  multilateral	  trade	  
regime	  whilst	  others	  think	  that	  RTAs	  can	  exist	  alongside	  multilateralism.	  Different	  studies	  conducted	  by	  
different	  institutions	  came	  out	  with	  different	  trade	  effects	  for	  the	  same	  RTA.	  This	  is	  owing	  to	  the	  usage	  of	  
different	  parameters	  like	  estimation	  methods,	  time	  periods	  and	  databases	  to	  measure	  the	  effect	  the	  RTA	  has	  
on	  trade	  (Cabalu	  and	  Alfonso	  2007,	  p.3).	  It	  is	  important	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	  which	  methodology	  is	  being	  used	  in	  a	  
certain	  study.	  Bhagwati,	  for	  instance,	  uses	  historical	  analysis	  to	  dissect	  how	  the	  GATT/WTO	  exceptions	  for	  RTAs	  
were	  created	  and	  will	  come	  to	  a	  different	  conclusion	  than	  someone	  who	  conducts	  a	  quantitative	  study	  of	  the	  
EU’s	  intra-­‐regional	  trade	  effects.	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3.3. 	  IPE’s	  Traditional	  view	  on	  RTA	  
	  
When	  discussing	  regionalism	  and	  multilateralism	  it	  is	  unthinkable	  not	  to	  mention	  the	  work	  of	  Jacob	  Viner.	  He	  
created	  the	  theory	  on	  trade	  creation	  and	  trade	  diversion,	  the	  “Vinerian	  dichotomy”	  (Viner, 1950).	  Trade	  
creation	  means	  that	  a	  more	  costly	  source	  is	  being	  substituted	  by	  a	  lower	  cost	  source	  of	  supply	  within	  the	  area	  
of	  the	  importing	  country.	  This	  situation	  is	  beneficial	  to	  all,	  both	  for	  the	  member	  countries	  and	  to	  the	  world.	  
Trade	  diversion	  is	  the	  opposite	  of	  trade	  creation (Jinji, Zhang, & Haruna, 2014).	  In	  this	  case	  a	  more	  costly	  
supplier	  from	  inside	  the	  area	  is	  substituted	  by	  a	  cheaper	  supply	  source	  from	  outside	  of	  the	  area (Lloyd & 
McLaren, 2004).	  	  
	  
Baldwin	  and	  Wyplosz (2009)say	  that	  the	  terms	  of	  ‘trade	  creation’	  and	  ‘trade	  diversion’	  have	  become	  so	  
commonplace,	  one	  cannot	  talk	  about	  preferential	  liberalisation	  without	  mentioning	  them (Baldwin & 
Wyplosz, The economics of the European Integration, Third edition, 2009).	  	  Even	  though	  there	  are	  several	  
shortcomings	  about	  these	  terms,	  mainly	  because	  they	  are	  based	  on	  a	  static	  analysis	  and	  only	  regard	  the	  results	  
of	  tariff	  reductions,	  not	  harmonization	  of	  standards.	  RTAs	  can	  induce	  terms	  of	  trade	  effects	  provided	  that	  the	  
members	  to	  the	  RTA	  are	  large	  countries (Panagariya, 2000) (Baldin & Venables, 1995).	  Regional	  trade	  
liberalisation	  has	  competition	  enhancing	  effects	  that	  are	  vital	  for	  industries	  exhibiting	  economies	  of	  scale	  when	  
they	  are	  confronted	  with	  imperfect	  competition (Ethier & Horn, 1984).	  A	  fair	  number	  of	  authors	  who	  are	  in	  
favour	  of	  RTAs,	  base	  their	  arguments	  on	  the	  Venerian	  dichotomy.	  They	  argue	  that	  an	  RTA	  that	  is	  formed	  
between	  nations	  who	  are	  already	  in	  an	  important	  trade	  relation	  or	  ‘natural	  partners’,	  will	  most	  likely	  produce	  
trade	  creation	  and	  not	  diversion (Saavedra-Rivano, 2001).	  In	  case	  of	  the	  TTIP	  these	  requirements	  are	  fulfilled	  
as	  the	  US	  and	  EU	  have	  been	  ‘natural	  partners’	  throughout	  most	  of	  history.	  Based	  on	  this	  reasoning	  we	  can	  
state	  that	  the	  TTIP	  will	  be	  more	  trade	  creating	  than	  trade	  diverting.	  
	  
Bhagwati	  and	  Panagariya	  claim	  that	  regionalisation	  diverts	  rather	  than	  creates	  trade	  because	  it	  creates	  
preferential	  treatment	  for	  the	  members	  of	  the	  RTA,	  thereby	  leaving	  the	  non-­‐members	  in	  the	  cold.	  They	  also	  
argue	  that	  when	  when	  countries	  are	  actively	  participating	  in	  the	  RTA	  they	  might	  consider	  the	  multilateral	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system	  as	  redundant (Bhagwati & Panagariya, 1996).	  On	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  argument	  we	  find	  the	  
supporters	  who	  claim	  that	  RTAs	  increase	  global	  trade	  liberalisation	  and	  thus	  lead	  to	  trade	  creation	  instead	  of	  
trade	  diversion (Bergsten, 1997).	  The	  proponents	  of	  RTAs	  say	  that	  the	  benefits	  of	  regionalism	  can	  be	  combined	  
without	  sacrificing	  the	  strengths	  of	  the	  WTO	  system.	  
	  
In	  the	  field	  of	  international	  political	  economy	  the	  standard	  analysis	  of	  this	  period	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  “Vinerian	  
analysis”.	  There	  are	  three	  basic	  effects	  that	  have	  been	  theoretically	  put	  under	  this	  nomer	  since	  the	  1950’s.	  The	  
first	  of	  thise	  effects	  is	  known	  as	  ‘Smith’s	  certitude’	  that	  is	  based	  on	  the	  famous	  Adam	  Smith	  from	  his	  work	  The	  
Wealth	  of	  Nations.	  Smith’s	  certitude	  goes	  as	  follows:	  “When	  a	  nation	  “exempt[s]	  the	  good	  of	  one	  country	  from	  
duties	  to	  which	  it	  subjects	  those	  of	  all	  other	  …	  the	  merchants	  and	  manufacturers	  of	  the	  country	  whose	  
commerce	  is	  so	  favoured	  must	  necessarily	  derive	  great	  advantage.”	  –	  Smith’s	  words	  (Wealth	  of	  Nations,	  1776)	  
quoted	  by	  Pomfret	  (1997).	  The	  second	  effect	  was	  created	  by	  Gottfried	  Haberler	  who	  stated	  that	  third	  nations	  
who	  are	  not	  part	  of	  the	  RTA	  will	  face	  trade	  losses (Haberler, 1936).	  This	  is	  called	  the	  ‘Haberler’s	  spillover’.	  
These	  form	  the	  tradional	  view	  of	  regionalism	  (Baldwin,	  21st	  Century	  Regionalism:	  Filling	  the	  gap	  between	  21st	  
century	  trade	  and	  20th	  century	  trade	  rules,	  2011).	  
	  
3.4. Realist	  point	  of	  view	  	  
	  
Realists	  see	  the	  upcoming	  of	  regionalisation	  as	  a	  reaction	  to	  changing	  security	  and	  power	  relationships	  in	  the	  
global	  order.	  They	  also	  believe	  that	  the	  construction	  of	  RTAs	  have	  important	  distributional	  effects	  whereby	  
some	  states	  benefit	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  others.	  The	  realists	  say	  that	  the	  larger	  member	  of	  the	  RTA	  will	  not	  allow	  
smaller	  members	  to	  receive	  benefits	  and	  expects	  ‘side	  payments’	  from	  the	  smaller	  countries	  if	  they	  want	  to	  
benefit.	  These	  side	  payments	  will	  exceed	  the	  expected	  economic	  benefit	  the	  smaller	  states	  would	  receive	  from	  
market	  access	  and	  economies	  of	  scale	  however.	  	  
	  
This	  was	  the	  case	  for	  Canada	  and	  Mexico	  when	  they	  wanted	  to	  open	  up	  trade	  with	  the	  United	  States	  in	  order	  
to	  gain	  access	  to	  the	  bigger	  market	  of	  the	  US.	  The	  US	  in	  its	  turn,	  expected	  Canada	  and	  Mexico	  to	  give	  side	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payments	  in	  areas	  like	  foreign	  investment	  and	  especially	  energy.	  This	  is	  why	  realists	  see	  RTAs	  as	  a	  
representation	  of	  the	  asymmetries	  in	  power,	  wealth	  and	  knowledge	  between	  states	  (Cohn	  2008,	  p.	  211)	  
	  
Realists	  see	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  bipolarity	  of	  power	  shared	  between	  
the	  U.S.	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  With	  the	  U.S.	  and	  the	  Soviet	  clashing	  about	  global	  power	  and	  security,	  the	  
European	  countries	  sought	  deeper	  integration	  in	  order	  to	  form	  a	  counterweight	  in	  a	  bipolar	  world.	  The	  U.S.	  as	  
the	  global	  hegemon	  used	  its	  superior	  military	  power	  to	  support	  the	  GATT	  negotiations	  to	  establish	  the	  
multilateral	  trading	  system.	  Little	  by	  little	  the	  hegemony	  of	  the	  U.S.	  started	  to	  decline	  as	  its	  interest	  in	  RTAs	  
started	  to	  grow.	  The	  U.S.	  felt	  its	  declining	  power	  and	  formed	  RTAs	  with	  its	  allies	  in	  order	  to	  win	  back	  its	  
economic	  leverage	  (Cohn	  2008,	  p.	  214-­‐215).	  
	  
3.5. Global	  Value	  Chains	  and	  21st	  Century	  Regionalism	  
	  
The	  rise	  in	  RTAs	  during	  the	  early	  1990’s	  was	  mainly	  due	  to	  the	  fear	  that	  the	  Uruguay	  Round	  would	  be	  a	  failure.	  
Many	  countries	  thus	  took	  precautions	  by	  setting	  up	  their	  own	  bi-­‐	  or	  multilateral	  trading	  agreements	  with	  their	  
economic	  partners	  as	  a	  ‘safety	  net’	  should	  the	  multilateral	  trading	  system	  collapse.	  However,	  the	  WTO	  system	  
did	  not	  collapse	  but	  in	  spite	  of	  this	  regionalisation	  continues	  to	  thrive.	  This	  latest	  wave	  of	  regionalisation	  is	  
characterised	  by	  containing	  far	  reaching	  regulatory	  clauses	  such	  as	  environment,	  investment	  and	  labour	  
standards	  and	  harmonisation.	  (Zakri,	  2003).	  Twenty-­‐first	  century	  regionalism	  is	  no	  longer	  preference-­‐centric	  
and	  goes	  beyond	  tariff	  reduction.	  
	  
The	  TTIP	  is	  an	  example	  of	  this	  trend	  as	  it	  contains	  clauses	  on	  investment	  and	  dispute	  settlement.	  It	  is	  therefore	  
interesting	  to	  study	  the	  reasons	  why	  countries	  are	  chosing	  this	  form	  of	  deeper	  integration	  on	  a	  regulatory	  
basis.	  New	  regionalism	  is	  seen	  as	  ‘open’	  regionalism	  as	  geographic	  proximity	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  prerequisite	  for	  
forming	  an	  RTA	  and	  it	  can	  even	  include	  several	  regions	  (Saavedra-Rivano, 2001).	  This	  is	  why	  the	  TTIP	  is	  a	  good	  
example	  of	  new	  regionalism	  since	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  US	  are	  geographically	  speaking	  far	  apart	  and	  it	  is	  an	  
agreement	  between	  a	  country	  and	  a	  region.	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As	  RTAs	  continue	  to	  expand	  amongst	  more	  countries,	  they	  tend	  to	  become	  supraregional.	  When	  a	  Customs	  
Union	  or	  a	  group	  of	  countries,	  which	  have	  a	  prior	  RTA	  amongst	  theirselves,	  form	  a	  new	  RTA	  with	  another	  
Customs	  Union	  or	  group	  of	  countries	  who	  are	  joined	  by	  a	  different	  RTA.	  The	  TTIP	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  example	  of	  
supraregionalism	  for	  it	  is	  formed,	  not	  between	  two	  countries,	  but	  between	  a	  country,	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  a	  
Customs	  Union,	  the	  European	  Union.	  
	  
Another	  factor	  that	  influenced	  the	  21st	  century	  regionalism	  is	  the	  proliferation	  of	  global	  value	  chains	  (GVCs)	  or	  
global	  production	  networks.	  This	  is	  what	  Grossman	  and	  Rossi-­‐Hansberg	  refer	  to	  as	  ‘trade	  in	  tasks’,	  which	  is	  also	  
known	  as	  outsourcing,	  offshoring	  or	  production	  fragmentation	  (Grossman	  &	  Rossi-­‐Hansberg,	  2006).	  As	  
globalisation	  spreads,	  so	  does	  the	  production	  process	  of	  the	  multinational	  companies.	  They	  will	  split	  up	  their	  
production	  process	  and	  relocate	  different	  production	  branches	  to	  where	  they	  find	  the	  best	  cost-­‐benefit	  ratio.	  A	  
company	  like	  Apple	  Inc	  might	  design	  its	  products	  in	  California,	  USA,	  but	  their	  assembly	  happens	  in	  China	  where	  
they	  can	  find	  cheaper	  labour	  forces.	  Before	  the	  end	  product	  ends	  up	  in	  our	  home,	  it	  has	  been	  twice	  around	  the	  
world	  already.	  Since	  the	  fragmentation	  of	  the	  production	  process	  can	  lead	  to	  ample	  difficulties	  and	  
complications,	  most	  companies	  and	  countries	  that	  benefit	  from	  this	  phenomenon	  are	  motivated	  to	  create	  RTAs	  
to	  simplify	  the	  cross-­‐border	  production	  process	  and	  to	  avoid	  double	  tariff	  levying.	  	  
	  
Just	  from	  looking	  at	  our	  current	  world	  trade,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  RTAs	  have	  brought	  their	  members	  more	  
economic	  welfare	  in	  most	  cases.	  The	  European	  Union	  as	  the	  most	  integrated	  region	  in	  the	  world	  is	  the	  best	  
example	  of	  potential	  welfare	  growth	  by	  RTAs.	  NAFTA	  has	  been	  very	  successful	  as	  well	  because	  it	  led	  to	  more	  
trade	  creation	  than	  trade	  diversion.	  Another	  region	  that	  could	  gain	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  trade	  benefits	  is	  the	  Asia	  
Pacific	  region	  and	  East	  Asia.	  Economic	  estimates	  have	  shown	  that	  the	  intra-­‐regional	  trade	  in	  East	  Asia	  would	  
surpass	  that	  of	  NAFTA	  (The	  Economist	  2000).	  Economic	  integration	  is	  bound	  to	  lead	  to	  market	  gains	  in	  the	  
region.	  East	  Asia	  therefore	  has	  a	  lot	  of	  integration	  potential	  in	  the	  world	  trade	  system	  (Webber	  2001,	  p.146).	  
The	  interdependence	  of	  production	  chains	  in	  the	  Asia	  Pacific	  region	  has	  never	  been	  higher.	  The	  cross-­‐country	  
value	  chains	  allow	  each	  country	  to	  specialise	  in	  the	  sector	  in	  which	  it	  has	  the	  comparative	  advantage.	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In	  figure	  2	  we	  can	  see	  the	  production	  chain	  of	  hard	  disk	  drive	  in	  Asia.	  Without	  any	  agreement	  between	  these	  
producing	  countries,	  the	  tariffs	  on	  each	  of	  the	  hard	  disk’s	  segments	  will	  lead	  to	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  the	  tariff	  is	  
higher	  than	  the	  price	  of	  the	  hard	  disk	  itself.	  If	  that	  is	  the	  case,	  it	  is	  better	  for	  the	  countries	  to	  each	  produce	  
their	  own	  hard	  disk	  in	  their	  national	  territory.	  The	  specialised	  technology	  needed	  for	  producing	  high-­‐tech	  
goods	  makes	  it	  difficult	  and	  costly	  to	  be	  borne	  by	  one	  state	  however.	  Splitting	  up	  the	  production	  process	  
between	  countries	  that	  can	  provide	  high-­‐skilled	  labourers	  and	  those	  that	  can	  provide	  cheap	  assembly	  leads	  to	  
more	  profit.	  In	  order	  to	  eradicate	  or	  at	  least	  lower	  the	  tariffs	  for	  this	  cross-­‐country	  production	  process,	  RTAs	  
should	  be	  put	  in	  place.	   
	  
	  
Figure	  1:	  Interdependence	  of	  production	  chains	  of	  hard	  disk	  driver	  in	  Asia	  Pacific	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3.6. Pros	  of	  regionalism	  	  
3.6.1. Safeguard	  against	  lagging	  multilateral	  liberisation	  
	  
RTAs	  can	  further	  liberalise	  trade	  despite	  lagging	  multilateral	  negotiations	  like	  the	  fiasco	  at	  the	  Doha	  
Development	  Round.	  The	  Doha	  Round	  started	  in	  2001	  but	  so	  far,	  no	  substantial	  agreements	  have	  been	  made.	  
It	  has	  been	  almost	  14	  years,	  that	  is	  too	  long	  for	  most	  countries	  to	  wait	  for	  further	  trade	  liberisation.	  Rodrigo	  de	  
Rato,	  former	  managing	  director	  of	  the	  International	  Monetary	  Fund,	  and	  Paul	  Wolowitz,	  former	  president	  of	  
the	  World	  Bank,	  warned	  the	  stagnating	  Doha	  Development	  Agenda	  will	  cause	  a	  shift	  to	  more	  bilateral	  or	  
regional	  free	  trade	  agreements	  that	  can	  undermine	  the	  principles	  of	  the	  multilateral	  trade	  system	  
	  
Figure	  2:	  Evolution	  of	  Regional	  Trade	  Agreements	  in	  the	  World,	  1948-­‐2015	  
Source:	  www.wto.org	  	  
	  
From	  the	  figure	  above	  we	  can	  see	  the	  number	  of	  RTAs	  has	  been	  increasing	  with	  a	  boom	  starting	  in	  the	  1990’s.	  
It	  was	  around	  this	  time	  that	  RTAs	  and	  multilateral	  trade	  liberalisation	  ceased	  to	  be	  parallel	  processess.	  Before	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RTAs	  and	  the	  WTO’s	  initiatives	  would	  follow	  each	  other	  up	  close	  in	  order	  to	  keep	  up	  with	  one	  another.	  It	  was	  
around	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Uruguay	  Round	  in	  1997	  that	  multilateral	  trade	  liberalisation	  slowly	  began	  to	  stagnate,	  
but	  regional	  and	  preferential	  trade	  liberalisation	  thrived.	  The	  lagging	  Doha	  Round	  gave	  RTAs	  a	  frontrunner	  
position	  and	  the	  parallelism	  (Baldwin, 21st Century Regionalism: Filling the gap between 21st century trade and 
20th century trade rules, 2011).	  RTAs	  can	  either	  be	  an	  outcome	  or	  a	  reaction	  to	  globalisation	  depending	  on	  
whether	  the	  RTA	  is	  accommodating	  or	  antagonistic	  respectively (Nesadurai, 2002).	  In	  case	  of	  the	  TTIP	  we	  can	  
say	  that	  it	  is	  an	  outcome	  of	  the	  global	  liberalisation	  process	  because	  it	  is	  accommodating	  rather	  than	  
antagonising	  liberalisation.	  
 
3.6.2. Deep	  regionalisation	  goes	  beyond	  WTO	  rules	  
	  
A	  number	  of	  studies	  conducted	  by	  the	  WTO,	  the	  Organisation	  for	  Economic	  Co-­‐operation	  and	  Development	  
(OECD),	  and	  the	  World	  Bank	  all	  concluded	  that	  regionalism	  does	  not	  form	  an	  impediment	  to	  the	  multilateral	  
trading	  system,	  but	  in	  fact	  stimulates	  it	  (Secretariat, 1995).	  The	  RTAs	  that	  were	  studied	  differ	  from	  the	  ones	  
that	  form	  the	  ‘new	  regionalism’.	  The	  report	  of	  the	  WTO	  Secretariat	  was	  analysed	  in	  terms	  of	  welfare	  and	  net-­‐
trade	  growth	  as	  effects	  of	  removal	  of	  border	  protection.	  ‘New	  Regionalism’,	  however,	  goes	  far	  beyond	  the	  
removal	  of	  border	  protection.	  It	  is	  characterised	  by	  a	  deep	  liberalisation	  into	  the	  regulatory	  system	  of	  the	  
partnering	  countries	  by	  harmonising	  their	  respective	  regulatory	  policies (Sampson, 2003).	  For	  these	  reasons	  we	  
are	  in	  need	  of	  a	  new	  analytical	  framework	  to	  assess	  the	  effect	  of	  RTAs	  from	  the	  new	  generation	  like	  the	  TTIP.	  
	  
As	  RTAs	  grow	  and	  evolve,	  the	  traditional	  views	  and	  analysis	  that	  estimated	  their	  impact	  on	  global	  trade	  lose	  
their	  value.	  According	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  advocates	  of	  RTAs,	  Baldwin	  claims	  that	  the	  new	  wave	  of	  
regionalism	  is	  indeed	  a	  building	  block,	  rather	  than	  a	  stumbling	  block	  (Baldwin	  &	  Seghezza,	  Are	  trade	  Blocs	  
Building	  or	  Stumbling	  blocks?	  New	  Evidence,	  2007).	  	  
A	  report	  by	  the	  WTO	  Secretariat	  of	  1995 (WTO, 1995, p. 62)	  shows	  that	  the	  members	  of	  an	  RTA	  often	  apply	  
the	  non-­‐tariff	  barriers	  that	  are	  part	  of	  the	  RTA	  to	  imports	  from	  third	  party	  states	  as	  well (Reiter, 2003).	  	  
	  
	  	  




Opponents	  of	  regionalism	  are	  concerned	  that	  bilateral	  Free	  Trade	  Agreements	  (FTAs)	  like	  the	  TTIP	  will	  
complicate	  the	  international	  trading	  system	  and	  reduce	  interest	  in	  the	  WTO.	  This	  depends	  on	  whether	  the	  FTA	  
in	  question	  is	  offensive	  or	  defensive.	  In	  an	  offensive	  FTA	  one	  country	  will	  use	  its	  bargaining	  leverage	  in	  order	  to	  
extract	  a	  preferential	  margin	  for	  its	  goods	  in	  the	  market	  of	  the	  other	  party	  to	  the	  FTA.	  This	  is	  the	  case	  for	  the	  
EU	  which	  figurates	  as	  an	  important	  hotspot	  for	  FTAs	  with	  the	  Eastern	  European	  and	  with	  the	  Mediterranean	  
countries.	  These	  bilateral	  FTAs	  are	  politically	  motivated	  because	  of	  the	  prosperity	  and	  stability	  it	  might	  bring	  to	  
the	  two	  parties.	  	  
	  
Defensive	  FTAs	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  are	  created	  to	  protect	  market	  shares	  as	  a	  reaction	  to	  another	  FTA	  concluded	  
by	  an	  important	  competitor	  in	  a	  key	  market.	  Even	  though	  most	  countries	  agree	  that	  the	  best	  way	  to	  reduce	  
preferential	  margins	  is	  through	  GATT	  negotiations,	  because	  then	  all	  tariff	  reductions	  are	  multilateralised	  to	  all	  
WTO	  members	  according	  to	  the	  MFN	  principle	  instead	  of	  through	  defensive	  FTAs,	  there	  are	  cases	  where	  
countries	  opt	  for	  the	  latter.	  For	  instance,	  the	  EU	  negotiated	  its	  own	  FTA	  with	  Mexico	  to	  oppose	  NAFTA	  by	  
negotiating	  tariff	  reductions	  that	  only	  benefit	  the	  EU.	  Following	  this	  logict,	  analysts	  also	  claim	  that	  if	  the	  APEC	  
countries	  form	  an	  FTA	  with	  the	  USA	  like	  partly	  did	  with	  the	  TPP,	  the	  EU	  will	  be	  inclined	  to	  also	  negotiate	  with	  
APEC	  to	  protect	  its	  market	  shares. (Wijkman, 2003).	  Now	  that	  the	  TPP	  is	  formed	  and	  the	  TTIP	  is	  on	  the	  way	  to	  
being	  formed,	  we	  might	  expect	  a	  new	  attempt	  of	  the	  EU	  to	  negotiate	  an	  FTA	  with	  the	  Asia-­‐pacific	  countries.	  
	  
The	  result	  of	  this	  process	  is	  that	  overlapping	  networks	  of	  bilateral	  FTAs	  emerge	  which	  raises	  the	  transaction	  
costs	  for	  companies’	  foreign	  trade.	  These	  extra	  costs	  are	  due	  to	  the	  adjustments	  the	  companies	  must	  make	  in	  
order	  to	  be	  compliant	  with	  all	  the	  different	  FTAs.	  This	  mainly	  harms	  small	  and	  medium	  sized	  businessess	  
because	  of	  the	  costs	  they	  incur	  by	  adjusting	  their	  products	  to	  the	  different	  technical	  legalities	  that	  apply	  to	  a	  
country	  in	  specific.	  One	  of	  the	  main	  arguments	  contra	  regionalism	  is	  that	  the	  bilateral	  FTAs	  and	  RTAs	  will	  form	  
trading	  blocs	  that	  will	  undermine	  the	  WTO	  system.	  However,	  the	  world	  economy	  has	  not	  been	  divided	  after	  
the	  emergence	  of	  trading	  blocs.	  This	  is	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  each	  trading	  bloc	  needs	  the	  others	  and	  this	  forms	  a	  
strong	  incentive	  to	  keep	  their	  economies	  open.	  Lawrence (2000)	  claims	  that:	  “In	  sum,	  the	  importance	  of	  extra-­‐
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regional	  trade	  to	  nationas	  all	  over	  the	  world	  means	  that	  no	  region	  is	  in	  a	  position	  to	  sever,	  or	  even	  significantly	  
curtail,	  its	  trade	  ties	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world	  by	  forming	  closed	  blocks.”	  He	  supports	  his	  claim	  by	  referring	  to	  
EU,	  Japan	  and	  the	  USA	  who	  are	  all	  global	  traders	  that	  may	  all	  benefit	  from	  RTAs	  but	  they	  cannot	  survive	  in	  an	  
isolated	  RTA	  between	  themselves.	  They	  need	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world	  too	  much	  to	  only	  relie	  on	  themselves	  
(Lawrence, Frieden, & Lake, 2000).	  RTAs	  and	  multilateral	  liberalisation,	  together	  have	  worked	  as	  a	  “double-­‐
header”	  and	  benefitted	  the	  smaller	  countries	  in	  the	  multilateral	  trading	  system.	  
	  
	  
3.6.3. Stepping	  stone	  towards	  multilateralism	  	  
	  
As	  mentioned	  before,	  the	  best	  way	  towards	  an	  open	  trading	  system	  is	  via	  non-­‐discriminatory	  global	  
multilateralism.	  Especially	  price-­‐taking	  countries,	  usually	  the	  developing	  countries,	  benefits	  most	  from	  
multilateralism	  because	  they	  lack	  the	  leverage	  ability	  in	  regional	  trade	  negotiations.	  That	  being	  said,	  the	  
increasing	  globalisation	  of	  markets	  also	  triggered	  a	  process	  of	  ‘mega-­‐regionalism’	  with	  RTAs	  like	  APEC,	  TTP	  and	  
the	  TTIP.	  This	  shows	  that	  more	  countries	  want	  to	  integrate	  more	  deeply	  than	  what	  the	  WTO	  agreements	  allow	  
at	  the	  moment.	  Developed	  countries	  are	  using	  regionalisation	  to	  increase	  their	  leverage	  in	  a	  world	  of	  scale	  
economies	  where	  there	  is	  no	  more	  hegemon	  that	  can	  unilaterally	  decide	  the	  course	  of	  the	  economy.	  Countries	  
still	  rely	  on	  regionalisation	  for	  development	  and	  competitiveness	  of	  their	  economy	  and	  group	  together	  to	  
maintain	  their	  economic	  position	  and	  adjust	  to	  the	  dynamic	  economic	  forces	  faster	  than	  multilateral	  
agreements.	  Even	  though	  global	  liberalisation	  is	  the	  ultimate	  goal,	  countries	  will	  often	  take	  the	  route	  of	  
regionalisation	  in	  order	  to	  form	  broader	  markets	  and	  to	  increase	  their	  competitive	  advantage.	  (Gonzalez-Vigil, 
2001).	  
	  
I	  believe	  that	  the	  most	  convincing	  argument	  why	  RTAs	  can	  be	  beneficial	  for	  global	  trade	  liberalisation	  is	  the	  
stepping	  stone	  argument.	  Allowing	  deeper	  regional	  integration	  might	  pave	  the	  way	  for	  more	  complex	  
multilateral	  negotiations.	  A	  good	  example	  of	  this	  is	  NAFTA.	  NAFTA	  liberalised	  trade	  in	  services	  before	  the	  WTO	  
(at	  that	  time	  still	  called	  GATT)	  did	  (Cabalu	  and	  Alfonso	  2009).	  Then	  there	  is	  the	  issue	  of	  trade	  diversion	  versus	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trade	  creation.	  Some	  RTAs	  lead	  to	  an	  amount	  of	  trade	  diversion,	  but	  there	  are	  RTAs	  who	  lead	  to	  more	  trade	  
creation.	  For	  example,	  NAFTA	  is	  an	  RTA	  that	  led	  to	  more	  trade	  creation	  than	  trade	  diversion	  (Hufbauer	  &	  
Schott	  2005).	  
	  
By	  now	  we	  can	  safely	  assume	  that	  globalisation	  and	  regional	  integration	  are	  complementary	  processes	  even	  
though	  they	  seem	  contradictory	  at	  first	  glance.	  Regionalisation	  should	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  intermediary	  step	  towards	  
ultimate	  global	  trade	  liberalisation	  as	  most	  of	  the	  economic	  motives	  behind	  the	  creation	  of	  RTAs	  are	  the	  same	  
ones	  used	  for	  globalisation.	  This	  theory	  clearly	  states	  that	  RTAs	  like	  the	  TTIP	  form	  a	  building	  block	  in	  the	  
process	  of	  liberalising	  the	  world	  trade	  (Saavedra-Rivano, 2001).	  	  
	  
3.6.4. Efficiency	  	  
	  
Another	  important	  argument	  in	  favour	  of	  economic	  integration	  is	  the	  efficiency	  that	  is	  reached.	  This	  is	  what	  the	  
standard	  neo-­‐classical	  economic	  theorems	  all	  agree	  on,	  bar	  none,	  that	  the	  free	  flow	  of	  goods	  and	  services	  
between	  two	  nations	  will	  increase	  their	  welfare	  (Saavedra-Rivano, 2001).	  Unilateral	  policymaking	  in	  countries	  
that	  are	  interdependent	  will	  most	  likely	  result	  in	  inefficient	  policies (Horn & Mavroidis, 2013).	  That	  is	  why	  it	  is	  
important	  for	  interdependent	  economies	  to	  work	  together	  to	  form	  efficient	  policies.	  This	  is	  why	  the	  TTIP	  is	  
such	  a	  good	  policy	  to	  take	  for	  the	  EU	  and	  US	  market	  since	  the	  trade	  flow	  between	  the	  two	  entities	  is	  already	  
massive,	  there	  are	  a	  lot	  of	  efficiency	  gains	  to	  be	  made.	  ome	  countries	  can	  liberalise	  faster	  on	  a	  regional	  level.	  
	  
The	  Doha	  Round	  has	  painfully	  exposed	  the	  WTO’s	  weakness	  of	  needing	  a	  consensus	  from	  all	  161	  members,	  
each	  wanting	  to	  put	  forward	  their	  own	  interest.	  RTAs	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  are	  negotiated	  between	  a	  small	  
number	  of	  parties	  who,	  on	  top	  of	  that,	  are	  usually	  more	  like-­‐minded.	  RTAs	  can	  thereby	  help	  reduce	  the	  
complexity	  of	  the	  WTO	  negotiations	  by	  first	  working	  out	  the	  disagreements	  within	  their	  region	  before	  joining	  
the	  negotiating	  table	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world.	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3.6.5. Economies	  of	  scale	  	  
	  
One	  of	  the	  most	  straightforward	  and	  economically	  logical	  reasons	  why	  RTAs	  are	  beneficial	  for	  trade	  is	  that	  they	  
contribute	  to	  economies	  of	  scale.	  Countries	  in	  Eastern	  Europe	  are	  trying	  very	  hard	  to	  become	  a	  member	  of	  the	  
EU	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  a	  huge	  market	  with	  low	  tariffs	  for	  their	  products.	  They	  also	  answer	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  
comparative	  advantage	  by	  allowing	  the	  smooth	  division	  of	  labour	  within	  the	  region	  like	  the	  European	  Union	  did	  
by	  allowing	  free	  traffic	  of	  labour.	  The	  TTIP	  will	  be	  the	  biggest	  RTA	  ever	  concluded	  with	  both	  of	  its	  members	  
being	  economies	  of	  scale	  by	  themselves	  already.	  The	  economic	  size	  of	  the	  market	  created	  by	  the	  TTIP	  will	  
create	  a	  bigger	  product	  differentiation	  because	  of	  the	  broad	  market.	  Its	  large	  size	  will	  make	  it	  possible	  to	  
develop	  more	  creatively	  as	  certain	  projects	  that	  would	  have	  seemed	  unreachable	  for	  either,	  might	  now	  seem	  
feasible	  in	  a	  common	  economic	  space	  (Saavedra-Rivano, 2001).	  	  
	  
3.6.6. Spillover	  effects	  	  
	  
Border	  countries	  to	  the	  US	  and	  the	  EU	  might	  prospect	  from	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  TTIP	  since	  they	  might	  become	  
more	  central	  to	  the	  newly	  created	  economic	  system. (Saavedra-Rivano, 2001).	  These	  are	  the	  so-­‐called	  
‘spillovers’	  that	  might	  take	  place	  after	  the	  installation	  of	  the	  TTIP.	  Another	  study	  has	  also	  shown	  that	  RTAs	  can	  
lead	  to	  trade	  creation	  amongst	  their	  members	  due	  to	  technology	  spillovers	  (Xu	  &	  Wang,	  1999)	  (Acharya	  &	  
Keller,	  2009).	  Later	  on	  we	  will	  also	  look	  briefly	  into	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  TTIP	  regarding	  political	  spillovers.	  
	  
	  
3.7. Cons	  of	  regionalism	  
3.7.1. Spaghetti-­‐bowl	  syndrome	  
	  
RTAs	  can	  also	  bring	  about	  negative	  effects	  in	  certain	  situations.	  It	  is	  therefore	  important	  that	  we	  understand	  
these	  downfalls	  and	  use	  that	  knowledge	  to	  prevent	  it	  from	  happening	  in	  the	  future.	  One	  of	  the	  potential	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problems	  caused	  by	  the	  increase	  in	  RTA	  combined	  with	  concluding	  bilateral	  FTAs,	  is	  is	  the	  occurrence	  of	  
overlapping	  membership.	  This	  overlap	  happens	  because	  every	  RTA	  develops	  its	  own	  ‘mini-­‐trade	  regime’	  and	  
countries	  that	  are	  member	  of	  more	  than	  one	  RTA	  will	  have	  to	  comply	  with	  different	  coexisting	  trade	  rules 
(WTO).	  	  Instead	  of	  smoothing	  out	  trade	  rules,	  the	  consequence	  is	  that	  trade	  flows	  are	  obstructed	  because	  the	  
companies	  incur	  increasing	  costs	  by	  having	  to	  comply	  with	  different	  sets	  of	  trade	  rules	  for	  the	  same	  product	  or	  
service.	  The	  proliferation	  of	  RTAs	  during	  these	  last	  few	  decades	  has	  created	  inconsistencies	  in	  the	  regulations	  
and	  procedures	  amongst	  RTAs.	  As	  the	  scope	  of	  RTAs	  enlarges,	  they	  risk	  creating	  regulatory	  confusion,	  
distortion	  of	  regional	  markets	  and	  implementation	  problems.	  The	  WTO	  is	  also	  concerned	  about	  the	  
inconsistencies	  that	  can	  arise	  between	  RTAs	  and	  the	  multilateral	  trading	  system	  now	  that	  RTAs	  are	  including	  
policy	  areas	  that	  are	  not	  yet	  regulated	  by	  the	  multilateral	  framework.	  
	  
The	  most	  known	  adversary	  of	  RTAs	  is	  Jagdish	  Bhagwati,	  calling	  RTAs	  ‘termites	  eating	  away	  at	  the	  multilateral	  
trading	  system’	  (Bhagwati	  2008,	  p.	  XII).	  He	  also	  prefers	  the	  name	  ‘Preferential	  Trade	  Agreement’	  to	  Free	  trade	  
agreement	  as	  it	  underlines	  the	  discriminatory	  effect	  and	  nature	  of	  these	  agreements.	  Another	  reason	  why	  
Bhagwati	  uses	  the	  term	  PTA	  is	  that	  the	  RTA	  is	  usually	  not	  only	  concluded	  between	  geographically	  close	  states,	  
but	  also	  with	  states	  who	  are	  physically	  distant	  from	  the	  other	  member	  states.	  	  
	  
Bhagwati	  refers	  to	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  overlapping	  trade	  rules	  of	  various	  RTAs	  as	  a	  ‘spaghetti	  bowl’	  (Bhagwati	  
2008,	  p.	  18).	  The	  increasing	  amount	  of	  bilateral	  Free	  trade	  agreements	  (FTAs)	  are	  creating	  a	  web	  of	  overlapping	  
rules	  that	  might	  jeopardise	  the	  transparency	  and	  predictability	  in	  international	  trade	  relations	  (Crawford	  &	  
Fiorentino	  2005,	  p.	  1).	  This	  is	  one	  of	  my	  concerns	  as	  well.	  The	  overlapping	  of	  bilateral	  trade	  rules	  has	  become	  a	  
complex	  phenomenon	  in	  regions	  like	  Asia	  and	  Europe.	  Equivalent	  to	  Bhagwati’s	  ‘spaghetti	  bowl’,	  Baldwin	  
refers	  to	  the	  Asian	  situation	  as	  the	  ‘noodle-­‐bowl	  syndrome’	  (Baldwin	  2007).	  	  
	  	  




Figure	  3:	  the	  Noodle	  Bowl	  Syndrome	  
	  	  	  Source:	  Baldwin	  2007,	  p.5	  
	  
The	  Noodle	  Bowl	  Syndrome	  poses	  a	  complex	  problem	  as	  it	  defeats	  the	  initial	  goal	  of	  RTAs.	  States	  establish	  an	  
RTA	  to	  make	  trade	  transactions	  go	  more	  smoothly,	  but	  the	  overlapping	  rules	  trigger	  lengthy	  legal	  discussions	  
between	  different	  parties.	  Integrating	  the	  different	  rules	  into	  one	  or	  more	  bigger	  RTAs	  can	  nevertheless	  solve	  
this	  problem.	  The	  states	  can	  also	  sit	  together	  to	  find	  the	  most	  occurring	  rules	  and	  try	  to	  pursuade	  the	  other	  
countries	  to	  harmonise	  them.	  	  
	  
3.7.2. Discriminatory	  RTAs	  
	  
Bhagwati (Fast track to nowhere, 1997)	  and	  others	  claim	  that	  RTAs	  are	  discriminatory	  by	  nature	  and	  therefore	  
incompatible	  with	  MFN	  treatment.	  Bhagwati	  claims	  that	  because	  RTAs	  and	  PTAs	  are	  per	  se	  discriminatory,	  they	  
are	  not	  free	  trade.	  Since	  the	  WTO	  explicitly	  allows	  the	  creation	  of	  RTAs	  and	  PTAs	  and	  their	  coexistence	  with	  the	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WTO	  rules,	  the	  WTO	  indirectily	  acknowledges	  that,	  in	  some	  cases,	  free	  trade	  needs	  to	  be	  put	  on	  the	  back	  
burner	  in	  favour	  of	  development	  through	  RTAs.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  WTO	  allows	  RTAs	  also	  means	  that	  free	  trade	  
is	  not	  the	  WTO’s	  top	  priority	  in	  the	  global	  economy	  (Gonzalez-­‐Vigil,	  2001).	  
	  
There	  is	  some	  truth	  to	  the	  claim	  that	  RTAs	  can	  be	  discriminatory,	  but	  nevertheless,	  the	  GATT/WTO	  has	  
provided	  exceptions	  to	  MFN	  in	  the	  Enabling	  clause4	  and	  in	  article	  XXIV	  GATT.	  The	  Least	  Developed	  Countries	  
(LDCs)	  can	  make	  exceptions	  to	  MFN	  via	  the	  Enabling	  Clause	  allowing	  them	  to	  discriminate	  against	  their	  trading	  
partners,	  which	  goes	  against	  the	  WTO’s	  principles.	  LDCs	  and	  developed	  countries	  also	  establish	  many	  bilateral	  
RTAs	  together.	  The	  danger	  here	  is	  that	  the	  rich	  countries	  will	  use	  their	  political	  and	  economic	  power	  to	  force	  
concessions	  from	  the	  LDCs	  (Abbott	  2007).	  	  
	  
Because	  of	  the	  dangers	  of	  discrimination	  and	  welfare	  loss	  due	  to	  RTAs,	  some	  authors	  warn	  the	  WTO	  not	  to	  be	  
too	  lenient	  in	  allowing	  disproportionate	  MFN	  exceptions.	  One	  of	  the	  solutions	  to	  preventing	  discriminatory	  
RTAs	  that	  cause	  welfare	  losses	  is	  to	  create	  stricter	  requirements	  that	  RTAs	  have	  to	  meet	  to	  form	  a	  legal	  
exception	  to	  MFN.	  An	  example	  of	  a	  stricter	  requirement	  could	  be	  to	  only	  exempt	  RTAs	  if	  they	  promise	  trade	  
creation	  and	  not	  trade	  diversion,	  that	  they	  are	  not	  too	  discriminatory	  and	  that	  they	  include	  deep	  levels	  of	  
integration.	  Deep	  levels	  of	  integration	  can	  be	  shown	  by	  the	  RTA	  if	  its	  goal	  is	  to	  form	  a	  single	  economic	  entity	  
like	  a	  customs	  union	  (Gonzalez-­‐Vigil,	  2001).	  I	  do	  not	  agree	  with	  all	  of	  these	  proposed	  requirements.	  Especially	  
the	  requirement	  of	  ‘promising	  to	  have	  a	  single	  economic	  entity	  as	  its	  goal’	  seems	  rather	  difficult	  to	  prove.	  
When	  the	  foundations	  of	  the	  current	  EU	  were	  laid	  out	  at	  first,	  there	  was	  no	  certainty	  that	  it	  would	  evolve	  into	  
the	  customs	  union	  with	  a	  single	  currency.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  GATT	  Council	  adopted	  the	  Decision	  on	  Differential	  and	  More	  Favourable	  Treatment,	  Reciprocity	  and	  Fuller	  Participation	  of	  
Developing	  Countries	  (the	  “Enabling	  Clause”)	  to	  waive	  Article I of the GATTfor	  certain	  arrangements,	  with	  respect	  
to,	  inter	  alia,	  “[r]egional	  or	  global	  arrangements	  entered	  into	  amongst	  less-­‐developed	  contracting	  parties	  for	  the	  mutual	  
reduction	  or	  elimination	  of	  tariffs”.-­‐www.wto.org	  /english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/gatt1994_09_e.htm	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Not	  all	  RTAs	  between	  rich	  and	  poor	  countries	  are	  purely	  to	  take	  advantage.	  RTAs	  can	  make	  foreign	  direct	  
investment	  in	  LDCs	  easier	  by	  lowering	  tariffs	  and	  by	  negotiating	  an	  investment	  arbitration	  clause	  to	  make	  the	  
investors	  feel	  more	  at	  ease.	  In	  LDCs	  the	  judicial	  system	  is	  often	  lacking	  and	  the	  establishment	  of	  an	  investors	  
arbitration	  court	  will	  gain	  more	  trust	  from	  foreign	  investors	  should	  a	  dispute	  arise.	  Furthermore,	  the	  WTO	  was	  
not	  established	  in	  order	  to	  help	  LDCs.	  It	  is	  not	  a	  development	  NGO	  supporting	  only	  third	  world	  countries	  and	  
therefore	  RTAs	  cannot	  be	  considered	  harmful	  in	  this	  aspect.	  The	  WTO’s	  goal	  is	  stated	  clearly	  on	  their	  main	  
page:	  
	  
“The	  World	  Trade	  Organization	  (WTO)	  deals	  with	  the	  global	  rules	  of	  trade	  between	  nations.	  Its	  main	  function	  is	  
to	  ensure	  that	  trade	  flows	  as	  smoothly,	  predictably	  and	  freely	  as	  possible.”-­‐@World	  Trade	  Organization	  2015	  
Disclaimer	  (https://www.wto.org/)	  
	  
Sometimes	  RTAs	  are	  created	  as	  a	  reaction	  to	  the	  threats	  of	  globalisation	  in	  which	  case	  they	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  
stumbling	  blocks (Bhagwati J. , The World Trading system at Risk, 1991).	  Developed	  and	  developing	  countries	  
have	  different	  priorities	  and	  will,	  therefore,	  react	  differently	  to	  globalisation	  making	  custom-­‐sized	  RTAs	  for	  
their	  respective	  problems.	  Saavedra-­‐Rivano	  referred	  to	  this	  problem	  as	  “a	  regionalisation	  of	  globalisation” 
(Saavedra-Rivano, 2001).	  
3.8. Why	  the	  TTIP?	  
3.8.1. Personal	  Reasons	  	  
	  
The	  reason	  why	  I	  chose	  the	  TTIP	  is	  twofold,	  personal	  and	  topical.	  My	  personal	  reason	  for	  choosing	  the	  TTIP	  
is	  that	  I	  am	  European.	  I	  have	  studied	  European	  law	  in	  my	  undergraduate	  degree	  and	  am	  therefore	  much	  
more	  knowledgeable	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  European	  trade	  policy	  issues	  and	  the	  EU’s	  competence	  in	  
negotiating	  international	  treaties.	  This	  prior	  knowledge	  and	  understanding	  of	  EU	  law	  and	  international	  
trade	  law	  allows	  me	  to	  follow	  the	  rationale	  of	  certain	  clauses	  of	  the	  TTIP	  better	  than	  those	  of	  other	  RTAs.	  
Certain	  aspects	  of	  the	  TTIP	  cannot	  be	  understood	  unless	  one	  is	  familiar	  with	  European	  law	  tradition	  and	  
ratio	  legis.	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3.8.2. Topical	  Reasons	  
	  
The	  second	  reason	  is	  topical,	  meaning	  that	  the	  TTIP	  is	  a	  good	  contemporary	  example	  of	  new	  regionalism	  
because	  of	  its	  immediate	  relevance	  to	  the	  topic.	  	  As	  elaborated	  above,	  new	  regionalism	  constitutes	  far	  
reaching	  regulatory	  clauses	  such	  as	  environment,	  investment	  and	  labour	  standards	  and	  harmonisation.	  It	  is	  no	  
longer	  preference-­‐centric	  and	  wants	  to	  go	  far	  beyond	  mere	  tariff	  reduction.	  It	  is	  also	  an	  example	  of	  mega-­‐
regionalism	  because	  of	  its	  vast	  size	  and	  economic	  scale,	  which may function as a benchmark for other RTAs 
in future.	  This	  way	  the	  TTIP	  personifies	  all	  the	  attributes	  of	  21st	  or	  new	  regionalism. 
	  
Another	  good	  example	  of	  new	  regionalism	  is	  the	  Trans-­‐Pacific	  Partnership	  (TTP).	  I	  lack,	  however,	  deep	  
knowledge	  of	  American	  trade	  law	  and	  the	  trade	  law	  of	  Asian	  countries.	  That	  is	  why	  I	  thought	  it	  be	  more	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4. The	  TTIP	  	  
4.1. History	  
The	  idea	  of	  a	  Transatlantic	  RTA	  is	  not	  a	  new	  one.	  	  As	  mentioned	  in	  the	  introduction,	  Klaus	  Kinkel,	  former	  
minister	  of	  foreign	  affairs	  from	  Germany,	  already	  proposed	  this	  kind	  of	  agreement	  back	  in	  1995 (Leibniz-
institut für Wirtschaftvorschung Center for economic studies, 2013).	  The	  roots	  of	  the	  TTIP	  were	  thus	  formed	  in	  
the	  1990s	  when	  a	  series	  of	  agreements	  was	  made,	  but	  eventually	  lost	  their	  purpose	  over	  time	  (Siebert, 2013).	  
The	  idea	  for	  the	  TTIP	  saw	  the	  light	  of	  day	  again	  when	  Germany	  was	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  EU-­‐presidency	  in	  2007	  
when	  the	  German	  Chancellor	  Angela	  Merkel	  set	  up	  the	  Transatlantic	  Economic	  Council.	  The	  members	  of	  this	  
council	  are	  government	  agencies	  like	  the	  US	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce	  but	  also	  private	  pressure	  groups	  like	  
Businesseurope	  and	  qlso	  the	  Bertelsmann	  Foundation.	  The	  Transatlantic	  Economic	  Council	  has	  done	  most	  of	  
the	  preparatory	  work	  before	  the	  joint	  High	  Level	  Working	  Group	  took	  over (Commission, 2013)	  (Choblet & 
Hager, 2015).	  
	  
4.2. Gross	  gains	  	  
The	  study	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  Centre	  for	  Economic	  Policy	  Research	  (hereinafter	  CEPR)	  is	  globally	  positive	  about	  
the	  effects	  of	  the	  TTIP	  (Centre	  for	  Economic	  Policy	  Research).	  It	  uses	  a	  computable	  general	  equilibrium(CGE)to	  
make	  a	  simulation	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  TTIP.	  This	  study	  was	  funded	  by	  the	  European	  Commission,	  but	  the	  CEPR	  
emphasises	  that	  it	  is	  an	  independent	  pan-­‐European	  economic	  research	  organisation.	  Therefore,	  its	  analysis	  and	  
conclusion	  are	  reached	  indepently	  by	  their	  researchers.	  Although	  this	  might	  be	  true,	  I	  thought	  it	  would	  be	  good	  
to	  also	  include	  another	  study	  by	  an	  organisation	  not	  (directly)	  sponsored	  by	  the	  EU.	  For	  that	  purpose,	  I	  read	  
the	  study	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  Konrad-­‐Adenauer	  Stiftung,	  which	  was	  funded	  only	  by	  the	  German	  government	  
(Konrad-­‐Adenauer	  Stiftung).	  
	  
In	  the	  following,	  I	  will	  summarise	  both	  organisations‘	  findings	  and	  how	  they	  support	  my	  hypothesis	  that	  the	  
TTIP	  can	  be	  economically	  efficient.	  	  	  According	  to	  the	  research	  of	  the	  Konrad-­‐Adenauer	  Stiftung,	  the	  main	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effects	  of	  the	  TTIP	  will	  be	  determined	  by	  three	  characteristics	  posessed	  by	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  US:	  the	  huge	  scale	  of	  
both	  economies,	  the	  already	  extensive	  intra-­‐firm	  trade	  between	  them	  and	  the	  high	  levels	  of	  intra-­‐industry	  
trade.	  The	  EU	  and	  the	  US	  have,	  due	  to	  the	  mutual	  intensive	  trade	  and	  investment,	  the	  world’s	  largest	  bilateral	  
economic	  relationship(Erixon	  and	  Bauer,	  2010)2.	  Together,	  these	  two	  economies	  represents	  more	  than	  40%	  of	  
the	  world	  GDP.	  This	  leads	  us	  easily	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  impact	  of	  eliminating	  trade	  barriers	  will	  have	  a	  global	  
effect	  on	  third	  countries	  to,	  willy	  nilly.	  	  	  	  
	  
By	  gross	  gains	  I	  mean	  the	  absolute	  gains	  in	  GDP,	  export/import	  and	  per	  household	  income.	  These	  numbers	  give	  
a	  good	  image	  of	  what	  gains	  the	  TTIP	  will	  bring	  to	  the	  economy.	  However,	  these	  numbers	  must	  be	  seen	  in	  light	  
of	  the	  overall	  picture	  illustrated	  by	  the	  effects	  on	  third	  countries,	  job	  market,	  consumer	  etcetera.	  Later	  on	  I	  will	  
expand	  on	  these	  issues,	  but	  for	  now	  I	  will	  share	  some	  interesting	  numbers	  of	  the	  latest	  studies.	  	  According	  to	  
CEPR’s	  study	  the	  economic	  gains	  for	  the	  EU	  by	  the	  TTIP	  could	  amount	  up	  to	  €120	  billion	  and	  for	  the	  US	  €95	  
billion,	  representing	  an	  increase	  of	  GDP	  of	  0.5%	  for	  the	  EU	  and	  of	  0.3%	  for	  the	  US.	  These	  gains	  would	  occur	  by	  
2027	  after	  full	  implementation	  of	  the	  agreement	  and	  given	  that	  the	  economies	  have	  gotten	  some	  time	  to	  
adjust	  to	  the	  new	  regime.	  	  	  	  	  
	  
4.3. Substantive	  provisions	  	  
4.3.1. Definition	  
	  
Substantive	  provisions	  or	  commitments	  deepen	  the	  existing	  obligation	  under	  the	  WTO	  agreements	  by	  eg	  
providing	  for	  mutual	  recognition,	  policy	  approximation,	  harmonisation	  
Substantive	  provisions	  have	  the	  tendency	  to	  be	  more	  progressive	  and	  therefore	  WTO-­‐plus	  material.	  They	  also	  
create	  more	  market	  opening	  than	  procedural	  provisions	  and	  has	  a	  greater	  effect	  on	  institutional	  
complementarity	  between	  the	  RTA	  and	  the	  multilateral	  level.	  Problems	  of	  institutional	  complementarity	  will	  
arise	  when	  there	  are	  substantial	  differences	  between	  the	  regulatory	  regimes	  of	  major	  trading	  parties,	  on	  one	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hand,	  and	  of	  the	  WTO,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  regarding	  a	  certain	  policy	  area	  (Reiter,	  2003).	  
	  
4.3.2. Minimising	  regulatory	  barriers	  
	  
Both	  the	  US	  and	  the	  EU	  have	  a	  relatively	  similar	  cost	  and	  production	  structure	  and	  a	  rather	  low	  barrier	  to	  
trade.	  In	  light	  of	  these	  circumstances	  we	  can	  deduct	  that	  the	  main	  impacts	  introduced	  by	  the	  TTIP	  will	  come	  
from	  lowering	  regulatory	  barriers.	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  that	  most	  companies	  are	  operating	  in	  Global	  Value	  
Chains(GVC)	  or	  in	  global	  production	  networks	  and	  being	  globally	  interlinked,	  are	  more	  affected	  by	  international	  
regulations.	  The	  TTIP	  will	  go	  a	  lot	  deeper	  in	  trade	  liberation	  than	  the	  WTO	  and	  its	  world	  trading	  rules	  by	  setting	  
standards	  and	  regulations,	  investment	  regulation	  and	  protection (Freytag, Draper, & Fricke, 2014).	  
	  
According	  to	  Freytag	  et	  alea	  (Freytag, Draper, & Fricke, 2014),	  referring	  to	  a	  study	  by	  Felbermayr	  and	  
Larch(2013)	  ,	  mainly	  major	  corporations	  that	  already	  export	  to	  the	  US	  will	  benefit	  from	  tariff	  elimination	  and	  
the	  consequential	  decreasing	  consumer	  prices.	  This	  reasoning	  counts	  mutatis	  mutandis	  for	  the	  US	  market.	  The	  
elimination	  of	  non-­‐tariff	  barriers	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  will	  mainly	  benefit	  small	  and	  medium-­‐sized	  enterprises.	  
High	  gains	  are	  expected	  from	  the	  elimination	  of	  non-­‐tariff	  barriers	  and	  also	  from	  the	  harmonisation	  of	  other	  
standards	  that	  have	  the	  same	  effect	  as	  trade	  barriers.	  According	  to	  a	  study	  conveyed	  by	  ECORYS (Berden, 
Francois, Thelle, Wymenga, & Tamminen, 2009)	  the	  reduction	  of	  non-­‐tariff	  measures	  can	  produce	  modest	  
improvements	  in	  national	  income	  and	  household	  income	  for	  both	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  US.	  In	  the	  most	  positive	  
scenario	  where	  the	  parties	  could	  manage	  to	  eliminate	  50%	  of	  non-­‐tariff	  barriers	  and	  regulatory	  divergences,	  
the	  real	  income	  could	  increase	  by	  0.7	  %	  for	  the	  EU	  and	  by	  0.3%	  for	  the	  US.	  Another	  study	  conveyed	  
by	  	  Fontagne,	  Gourdon	  and	  Jean(2013)	  which	  uses	  a	  different	  CGE	  model	  finds	  that	  a	  25%	  reduction	  of	  non-­‐
tariff	  measures	  together	  with	  a	  100%	  reduction	  in	  tariff	  duties	  produces	  a	  0.3%	  increase	  in	  the	  GDP	  of	  both	  the	  
EU	  and	  the	  US	  in	  the	  long	  term.	  	  
	  
The	  TTIP’s	  main	  aim	  is	  to	  reduce	  regulatory	  barriers	  to	  approximate	  the	  markets	  in	  the	  US	  and	  the	  EU.	  
According	  to	  the	  analytical	  framework	  for	  the	  qualitative	  assessment	  of	  RTAs	  designed	  by	  Woolcock	  (2003),	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substantive	  provisions	  that	  contain	  approximation	  will	  reduce	  costs	  and	  make	  the	  markets	  of	  the	  member	  
states	  more	  compatible	  (Woolcock,	  2003).	  When	  national	  standards	  differ,	  suppliers	  need	  to	  adjust	  their	  
product	  to	  each	  different	  national	  standard	  if	  they	  wish	  to	  import	  their	  products.	  Approximation	  will	  reduce	  
the	  costs	  and	  enable	  conformance	  assessment	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  happening	  in	  the	  past	  with	  the	  harmonisation	  
of	  standards	  by	  the	  OECD	  countries	  to	  wipe	  out	  national	  regulatory	  barriers.	  These	  regional	  norms	  might	  go	  
further	  than	  international	  norms	  and	  standards	  making	  them	  a	  WTO-­‐plus	  RTA.	  	  
	  
Another	  frame	  of	  substantive	  provisions	  is	  the	  mutual	  recognition	  or	  equivalence	  of	  certificates	  or	  tests.	  
Suppliers	  from	  third-­‐countries,	  however,	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  benefit	  from	  this	  mutual	  recognition.	  The	  
harmonisation	  will	  promote	  market	  access	  by	  cutting	  the	  costs	  for	  suppliers	  by	  approximating	  national	  and	  
European	  standards,	  regulations	  and	  conformance	  assessment	  provisions.	  The	  impact	  of	  this	  harmonisation	  
will	  depend	  on	  how	  much	  farther	  is	  goes	  than	  the	  WTO’s	  or	  other	  international	  stardardisation	  bodies	  
standards.	  If	  the	  standards	  of	  the	  TTIP	  differ	  too	  much	  from	  international	  standards	  it	  could	  lead	  to	  regional	  
preference.	  Regional	  standards	  can	  become	  a	  form	  of	  preference	  when	  they	  differ	  from	  the	  standards	  that	  are	  
applicable	  in	  the	  domestic	  market	  of	  the	  supplier	  (Woolcock,	  2003).	  	  
	  
Another	  potential	  consequence	  of	  regional	  harmonisation,	  especially	  in	  case	  of	  the	  TTIP,	  is	  that	  other	  countries	  
might	  feel	  obligated	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  regional	  standard	  of	  the	  dominant	  markets.	  This	  has	  happened	  before	  
in	  case	  of	  the	  EU	  and	  non-­‐EU	  members	  who	  oblige	  EU	  standards	  without	  any	  legal	  obligation.	  Access	  to	  the	  EU	  
market	  can	  only	  be	  granted	  to	  products	  that	  comply	  with	  the	  EU	  acquis	  communautaire,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  
or	  not	  the	  country	  of	  origin	  is	  negotiating	  access	  to	  the	  EU	  or	  not	  (Woolcock,	  2003).	  	  
	  
4.3.3. Mutual	  recognition	  of	  standards	  
	  
The	  TTIP	  will	  make	  it	  possible	  for	  bureaus	  or	  centres	  of	  the	  EU	  and	  US	  to	  mutually	  recognise	  each	  other’s	  
performance	  standards	  or	  certificats.	  This	  is	  another	  frame	  of	  the	  substantive	  provisions	  in	  the	  TTIP.	  
Recognition	  means	  that	  the	  performance	  stardards	  of	  the	  exporting	  state	  are	  regarded	  equivalent	  to	  those	  of	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the	  country	  of	  import.	  For	  example;	  once	  a	  product	  gets	  approval	  in	  the	  US,	  it	  can	  enter	  the	  EU	  without	  a	  
second	  test	  or	  check	  by	  a	  laboratory	  in	  the	  EU	  and	  mutatis	  mutandis.	  Mutual	  recognition	  opens	  up	  the	  market	  
and	  reduces	  the	  costs	  since	  there	  is	  no	  need	  for	  secondary	  testing.	  However,	  if	  the	  the	  concern	  that	  third	  
parties	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  meet	  the	  requirements	  set	  forth	  by	  the	  mutual	  recognition	  agreement.	  If	  this	  is	  the	  
case,	  it	  leads	  to	  regional	  preference.	  Another	  form	  of	  regional	  preference	  would	  occur	  if	  third	  parties	  meet	  all	  
the	  conditions	  for	  equivalence	  of	  tests	  but	  are	  not	  allowed	  to	  enter	  into	  the	  mutual	  recognition	  agreement	  
(Woolcock,	  2003).	  
	  
4.4. Procedureal	  commitments	  	  
4.4.1. definition	  	  
	  
Procedural	  commitments	  can	  take	  various	  forms,	  for	  example;	  measures	  to	  increase	  transparancy,	  promoting	  
cooperation,	  reviewing	  existing	  agreements	  with	  the	  purpose	  of	  strengthening	  them,	  bilateral	  dispute	  
settlement	  mechanism	  
	  
4.4.2. ISDS	  Investment	  dispute	  
	  
An	  important	  part	  of	  the	  TTIP	  will	  be	  the	  ISDS	  mechanism.	  The	  ISDS	  would	  fall	  under	  the	  division	  
‘implementation	  and	  enforcement’	  in	  Woolcock’s	  framework	  (Woolcock,	  2003).	  In	  order	  to	  effectively	  
implement	  and	  enforce	  the	  ISDS,	  the	  TTIP	  would	  contain	  remedies	  and	  judicial	  instruments.This	  allows	  the	  TTIP	  
to	  make	  effective	  reviews	  and	  apply	  remedies	  to	  these	  disputes.	  This	  will	  implement	  more	  liberalisation	  and	  
non-­‐discriminatory	  measures	  between	  the	  two	  parties.	  A	  downfall	  of	  this	  mechanism	  is	  that	  it	  does	  not	  extend	  
to	  to	  third	  parties	  (Woolcock,	  2003).	  	  NAFTA	  also	  offers	  investor-­‐state	  dispute	  settlement	  clauses	  in	  addition	  to	  
national	  law.	  If	  third	  states	  are	  not	  granted	  equal	  rights	  into	  the	  remedies	  it	  forms	  a	  regional	  preference.	  The	  
TTIP	  can	  be	  regarded	  at	  WTO-­‐plus	  in	  this	  area	  for	  it	  provides	  a	  review	  mechanism	  and	  an	  ultimate	  remedy	  for	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its	  market	  participants	  concerning	  the	  application	  of	  regulations	  in	  the	  area	  of	  investments.	  
	  
4.4.3. Anti-­‐	  competitive	  practices	  
	  
the	  regional	  agreement	  can	  open	  up	  the	  market	  by	  making	  sure	  that	  anti-­‐competitive	  practices	  do	  not	  limit	  
trade.	  When	  public	  regulatory	  barriers	  of	  a	  segment	  of	  the	  market	  are	  removed,	  it	  will	  lead	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  
private	  barriers	  that	  are	  often	  less	  transparant.	  Sectors	  that	  were	  publicly	  regulated	  before,	  might	  behave	  
differently	  than	  excepted	  because	  there	  is	  no	  knowledge	  of	  the	  economic	  behaviour	  of	  that	  sector	  after	  
deregulation	  and	  opening	  up	  to	  competition.	  Providers	  with	  a	  monopoly	  in	  one	  country	  might	  try	  to	  enter	  the	  
foreign	  market,	  which	  are	  liberalised,	  and	  will	  cause	  competitive	  distortions.	  This	  behaviour	  has	  been	  seen	  
before	  regarding	  the	  telecom-­‐sector	  or	  energy	  sector.	  The	  GATS	  art.	  VIII:2	  was	  created	  to	  deal	  with	  these	  
potentially	  comptetitive	  distortions	  (Woolcock,	  2003) 
	  
	  
4.5. TTIP	  in	  the	  analytical	  framework 
4.5.1. 	  Open	  regionalism 
	  
Even	  though	  the	  negotiations	  only	  involve	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  USA	  for	  now,	  we	  cannot	  say	  with	  complete	  certainty	  
that	  the	  TTIP	  will	  be	  a	  closed	  RTA.	  From	  EU	  side	  it	  is	  not	  closed	  since	  there	  still	  exists	  the	  possibility	  of	  other	  
countries	  to	  enter	  to	  the	  EU.	  By	  entering	  to	  the	  EU	  the	  new	  member	  states	  automatically	  become	  a	  member	  of	  
all	  international	  agreements	  that	  bind	  the	  EU.	  Article	  216	  of	  the	  Treaty	  on	  the	  Functioning	  of	  the	  EU.	  	  
	  
Another	  aspect	  of	  open	  regionalism	  is	  that	  the	  TTIP	  can	  function	  as	  a	  benchmark	  for	  other	  RTAs	  or	  for	  the	  WTO	  
system.	  	  If	  the	  TTIP	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  a	  succes,	  it	  can	  use	  its	  good	  practices	  and	  share	  them	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  
world.	  The	  good	  practices	  of	  TTIP	  could	  be	  extended	  to	  other	  countries	  and/or	  regions.	  This	  potential	  shows	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that	  the	  TTIP	  will	  not	  affect	  the	  WTO	  system	  in	  a	  negative	  way,	  but	  might	  form	  a	  catalyst	  for	  the	  multinational	  
trading	  system.	  
4.5.2. More	  trade	  creation	  than	  trade	  diversion	  
	  
According	  to	  most	  of	  the	  studies	  conducted	  by	  diversified	  agencies	  and	  working	  groups,	  the	  TTIP	  will	  create	  a	  
great	  deal	  of	  economic	  gains	  between	  the	  U.S.	  and	  the	  EU.	  Regarding	  the	  effects	  on	  third	  parties	  the	  opinions	  
differ,	  but	  overall,	  good	  spillover	  effects	  are	  expected	  to	  come	  from	  the	  TTIP.	  This	  is	  due	  to	  the	  expectation	  
that	  the	  TTIP	  will	  set	  forth	  a	  global	  standard	  that	  other	  third	  party	  countries	  will	  try	  to	  implement	  as	  well.	  
Several	  studies	  have	  shown	  the	  potential	  consequences	  of	  the	  TTIP	  for	  the	  economy	  (see	  supra	  Chapter	  4).	  
Even	  though	  some	  studies	  are	  rather	  sceptical,	  the	  overall	  tencdency	  is	  optimistic	  amongst	  economists.	  	  
	  
4.5.3. WTO	  compatible	  	  
	  
According	  to	  the	  information	  provided	  by	  the	  WTO	  and	  the	  EU	  Commission,	  the	  TTIP	  is	  compatible	  with	  the	  
MFN-­‐exceptions	  as	  provided	  by	  Art.	  XXIV	  GATT	  and	  Art.	  V	  GATS.	  As	  explained	  above,	  in	  order	  to	  be	  compatible	  
with	  the	  articles	  XXIV	  GATT	  and	  V	  GATS,	  the	  agreement	  has	  to	  cover	  “substantially	  all	  trade”.	  The	  vast	  size	  of	  
the	  TTIP	  will	  ensure	  that	  this	  requirement	  is	  fulfilled.	  The	  second	  requirement	  is	  that	  the	  TTIP	  must	  not	  raise	  
the	  average	  level	  of	  MFN.	  This	  requirement	  is	  also	  fulfilled	  since	  the	  TTIP	  concerns	  harmonisation	  of	  standards	  
and	  other	  procedural	  and	  substantive	  provisions	  that	  are	  WTO+.	  
	  
4.5.4. No	  overlap	  with	  existing	  agreements	  (no	  spaghetti-­‐bowl	  syndrome)	  
	  
The	  TTIP	  covers	  much	  more	  than	  the	  existing	  trade	  agreement	  that	  the	  U.S.	  and	  the	  EU	  have	  made	  with	  other	  
parties	  who	  will	  not	  be	  part	  of	  the	  TTIP.	  Since	  the	  TTIP’s	  main	  focus	  is	  on	  harmonisation	  and	  minimising	  
regulatory	  barriers,	  it	  goes	  beyond	  most	  bilateral	  tariff	  reduction	  agreements.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  risk	  of	  the	  
spaghetti-­‐bowl	  syndrome	  is	  minimal	  for	  the	  TTIP.	  This	  shows	  that	  the	  consequences	  of	  the	  TTIP	  will	  not	  affect	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the	  multinational	  trading	  system	  negatively	  in	  this	  aspect.	  It	  might	  even	  help	  to	  harmonise	  all	  other	  RTAs	  along	  
the	  way.	  	  
	  
4.5.5. Deep	  regionalisation	  	  
	  
Another	  reason	  why	  the	  TTIP	  will	  not	  damage	  the	  WTO	  system	  is	  that	  its	  main	  goal	  is	  harmonisation	  of	  
standards.	  Contrary	  to	  the	  WTO,	  who	  focuses	  on	  global	  tariff	  reduction,	  the	  TTIP’s	  aim	  goes	  above	  and	  beyond	  
that	  by	  its	  deep	  regionalisation.	  It	  not	  only	  contains	  substantive	  provisions	  concerning	  minimising	  regulatory	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5. Problems	  regarding	  the	  TTIP	  
5.1. Waves	  of	  protest	  	  
As	  the	  negotiations	  continued,	  the	  protest	  began	  to	  grow	  bigger.	  What	  began	  as	  sceptical	  murmurs	  ended	  up	  
in	  a	  protest	  mars	  of	  hundreds	  of	  thousands.	  There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  reasons	  that	  have	  caused	  this	  public	  outcry	  
are	  ample.	  Even	  though	  the	  European	  Commission	  has	  calculated	  that	  the	  TTIP	  will	  provide	  revenue	  of	  545	  
euro	  per	  households,	  some	  economists	  say	  that	  it	  is	  not	  certain	  this	  extra	  money	  will	  end	  up	  at	  the	  households,	  
but	  instead	  stick	  to	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  big	  companies.	  More	  than	  3	  million	  people	  in	  Europe	  have	  signed	  a	  
petition	  against	  the	  TTIP	  (Campaign	  Office	  of	  the	  European	  Citizen’s	  Initiative	  “Stop	  TTIP”).	  
	  
These	  protest	  make	  it	  clear	  that,	  at	  least	  for	  the	  European	  side,	  money	  is	  not	  everything.	  Most	  Europeans	  seem	  
to	  be	  concerned	  about	  how	  this	  transatlantic	  deal	  will	  affect	  their	  public	  sector	  such	  as	  healthcare,	  pensions,	  
education	  etcetera.	  Their	  fear	  is	  legitimate	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  approach	  to	  the	  public	  sector	  is	  very	  different	  
in	  the	  US	  and	  the	  EU.	  Europeans	  fear	  that	  the	  entrance	  of	  the	  US	  into	  the	  market	  will	  lead	  to	  more	  privatisation	  
and	  higher	  costs	  in	  the	  long	  run.	  
	  
5.2. Secrecy	  	  
Although	  it	  is	  not	  unusual	  for	  international	  trade	  talks	  to	  be	  kept	  under	  the	  wraps,	  protestors	  are	  infuriated	  
that	  big	  companies	  do	  get	  some	  access	  whilst	  the	  public	  does	  not.	  This	  injustice	  sets	  more	  bad	  blood	  amongst	  
the	  public	  because	  they	  believe	  that	  major	  companies	  can	  influence	  the	  trade	  talks	  to	  shape	  it	  to	  their	  needs.	  
This	  goes	  against	  the	  principles	  of	  a	  democratic	  society.	  
Wikileaks	  has	  offered	  a	  reward	  of	  100,000	  euro	  for	  TTIP	  documents	  on	  its	  website	  (Wikileaks	  website)	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5.3. Undemocratic	  	  
Many	  a	  people	  fear	  that	  the	  TTIP	  will	  give	  more	  power	  to	  companies,	  thus	  taking	  away	  power	  from	  the	  
electorate	  and	  the	  democratic	  system.	  Especially	  European	  labour	  organisations	  and	  other	  pressure	  groups	  
claim	  that	  the	  TTIP	  will	  render	  American	  companies	  too	  powerful.	  The	  protestors	  believe	  that	  the	  TTIP	  will	  
contain	  dispute	  settlement	  regulations	  via	  which	  the	  corporations	  can	  easily	  sue	  governments	  over	  laws	  that	  
could	  potentially	  hurt	  their	  business.	  Sceptici	  in	  Europe	  fear	  that	  American	  companies	  will	  use	  the	  dispute	  
settlement	  mechanism	  provided	  in	  the	  TTIP	  as	  a	  leeway	  around	  the	  traditional	  court	  system.	  They	  fear	  that	  the	  
EU’s	  high	  environmental	  and	  health	  standards	  will	  be	  attacked	  and	  judged	  by	  an	  obscure	  arbritration	  system	  
that	  is	  not	  legally	  obliged	  to	  make	  its	  judgement	  public.	  	  
	  
The	  protestors	  give	  the	  example	  of	  British	  American	  Tobacco	  Australasia	  Limited	  v	  The	  Commonwealth.	  This	  
case	  concerns	  Philip	  Morris’	  lawsuit	  against	  the	  Australian	  government’s	  rule	  on	  plain	  packaging	  laws	  for	  
cigarettes	  ‘Tobacco	  Plain	  Packaging	  Act	  2011’	  (High	  Court	  of	  Australia,	  S389/2011,	  2012).	  Another	  example	  is	  
the	  case	  of	  Vattenfal,	  a	  Swedish	  energy	  company,	  against	  the	  German	  government	  concerning	  Germany’s	  
decision	  to	  abolish	  nuclear	  power	  brought	  before	  the	  International	  Centre	  for	  the	  Settlement	  of	  Investment	  
Disputes	  (ICSID).	  Vattenfall	  challenged	  the	  German	  government	  and	  its	  environmental,	  energy	  and	  safety	  policy	  
and	  demanded	  an	  enormous	  compensation	  claim	  to	  be	  paid	  from	  Germany’s	  state	  treasury.	  As	  it	  was	  brought	  
before	  an	  arbritrary	  tribunal,	  there	  was	  no	  access	  for	  the	  public	  whatsoever	  and	  no	  disclosure	  of	  the	  
documents.	  This	  lack	  of	  transparancy	  in	  a	  case	  where	  the	  state’s	  public	  financial	  resources	  and	  thus	  the	  
taxpayers’	  money	  is	  concerned,	  should	  raise	  serious	  questions	  about	  the	  democratic	  deficit	  in	  international	  
arbitration.	  In	  cases	  of	  investment	  arbitration	  there	  needs	  to	  be	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  transparancy	  in	  order	  to	  
inform	  the	  public.	  There	  should	  be	  enough	  access	  to	  the	  documents	  of	  the	  arbitrary	  proceedings	  to	  check	  if	  the	  
facts	  are	  corrects	  and	  if	  the	  laws	  are	  applied	  correctly.	  This	  guarantees	  the	  ability	  to	  balance	  the	  public	  
interests	  and	  the	  state’s	  regulatory	  autonomy	  against	  private	  corporate	  interests	  (Bernasconi-­‐Osterwalder	  &	  
Brauch,	  2014).	  	  
 
Not	  all	  European	  politicians	  want	  the	  agreement	  to	  implement	  this	  international	  tribunal	  system,	  but	  there	  are	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also	  strong	  supporters	  of	  the	  ISDS	  mechanism.	  The	  US	  is	  in	  any	  case	  a	  big	  proponent	  of	  the	  tribunal	  for	  
investment	  disputes.	  
	  
5.4. Difference	  in	  protection	  of	  consumer	  health	  and	  environment	  
One	  of	  the	  biggest	  obstacles	  for	  the	  TTIP	  is	  the	  precautionary	  principle	  of	  EU	  legislation.	  In	  the	  EU,	  legislators	  
will	  prohibit	  those	  products	  of	  which	  science	  is	  not	  able	  to	  outrule	  that	  there	  is	  not	  even	  the	  smallest	  risk	  for	  
the	  health	  of	  people,	  animals	  and	  plants.	  Article	  191	  of	  the	  Treaty	  on	  the	  Functioning	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  
contains	  the	  precautionary	  principle	  as	  enabling	  rapid	  response	  in	  the	  face	  of	  a	  possible	  danger	  to	  human,	  
animal	  or	  plant	  health,	  or	  to	  protect	  the	  environment.	  In	  particular,	  where	  scientific	  data	  do	  not	  permit	  a	  
complete	  evaluation	  of	  the	  risk,	  recourse	  to	  this	  principle	  may,	  for	  example,	  be	  used	  to	  stop	  distribution	  or	  order	  
withdrawal	  from	  the	  market	  of	  products	  likely	  to	  be	  hazardous5.	  In	  the	  USA,	  the	  opposite	  is	  the	  rule:	  unless	  
science	  can	  unequivocally	  prove	  that	  the	  product	  is	  dangerous,	  it	  can	  enter	  the	  market.	  Sort	  of	  a	  ‘not	  
dangerous	  until	  proven’,	  whereas	  in	  the	  EU	  it	  is	  ‘suspected	  dangerous	  until	  proven	  not’.	  The	  USA	  want	  the	  EU	  




5.5. The	  scope	  of	  the	  TTIP	  
The	  TTIP	  is	  being	  negotiated	  multilaterally	  since	  the	  EU	  is	  made	  up	  of	  28	  countries.	  If	  successfully	  negotiated,	  
the	  TTIP	  will	  comprise	  around	  40%	  of	  the	  world’s	  gross	  domestic	  product	  (GDP)	  and	  30%	  of	  the	  world	  trade.	  
Due	  to	  its	  size	  and	  ratio	  of	  GDP	  the	  TTIP	  is	  considered	  as	  a	  mega-­‐regional	  agreement	  (Freytag,	  Draper,	  &	  Fricke,	  
2014).	  The	  sheer	  size	  of	  the	  TTIP	  is	  both	  a	  blessing	  and	  a	  curse.	  A	  blessing	  because	  it	  will	  undoubtfully	  have	  a	  
large	  impact	  on	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world.	  If	  the	  USA	  and	  EU	  work	  together	  to	  set	  up	  high	  standards	  for	  health	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  (http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/consumers/consumer_safety/l32042_en.htm)	  
6	  (Kopinga,	  2015)	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environment	  regulations	  then	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world	  might	  be	  more	  compelled	  to	  raise	  their	  standards	  as	  well	  in	  
order	  to	  become	  a	  trade	  partner	  as	  well.	  But	  the	  downside	  of	  its	  huge	  size	  is	  that	  many	  developing	  countries	  
and	  growing	  economies	  fear	  that	  they	  will	  lose	  out	  once	  this	  deal	  is	  been	  made.	  
	  
The	  TTIP	  will	  encompass	  a	  free	  trade	  area	  that	  represents	  almost	  50%	  of	  the	  world’s	  trade,	  but	  only	  11,8%	  of	  
the	  world’s	  population	  (Leibniz-­‐institut	  für	  Wirtschaftvorschung	  Center	  for	  economic	  studies,	  2013).	  	  This	  
illustrates	  almost	  painfully	  how	  inbalanced	  the	  concentration	  of	  world	  trade	  is	  geographically	  situated	  and	  how	  
much	  power	  these	  two	  trading	  blocks	  can	  yield.	  Since	  it	  is	  a	  bilateral	  agreement,	  it	  will	  mainly	  create	  benefits	  
for	  EU	  and	  USA	  but	  as	  I	  mentioned	  above,	  third	  countries	  who	  are	  not	  member	  to	  the	  TTIP	  might	  undergo	  the	  
negative	  consequences.	  Scholars	  fear	  that	  the	  extra	  job	  creation	  in	  the	  USA	  and	  the	  EU	  will	  be	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  
loss	  of	  jobs	  in	  non-­‐member	  states.	  (Unmüßig	  &	  Falk,	  2014).	  Unlike	  most	  other	  RTAs	  where	  parties	  of	  both	  the	  
periphery	  and	  the	  center	  are	  found,	  the	  TTIP	  is	  a	  center-­‐center	  agreement.	  As	  the	  TTIP	  would	  be	  an	  agreement	  
between	  the	  world’s	  biggest	  economies,	  there	  is	  no	  doubt	  it	  will	  have	  a	  serious	  economic	  impact	  worldwide	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6. The	  TTIP	  in	  the	  scheme	  of	  European	  integration	  
6.1. 	  A	  brief	  history	  	  
The	  first	  major	  integration	  act	  of	  what	  would	  become	  the	  future	  European	  Union	  was	  formed	  shortly	  after	  
World	  War	  II.	  In	  order	  to	  preserve	  peace	  and	  to	  end	  inflation	  wars	  the	  European	  Coal	  and	  Steel	  Community	  was	  
established	  in	  1952	  by	  six	  countries	  Belgium,	  France,	  Germany,	  Italy,	  Luxembourg	  and	  the	  Netherlands.	  Its	  
founding	  fathers	  included	  Jean	  Monnet,	  Robert	  Schuman,	  Paul-­‐Henri	  Spaak	  and	  Alcide	  De	  Gasperi.	  The	  goal	  of	  
this	  community	  was	  to	  strengthen	  and	  unify	  the	  ties	  between	  the	  countries	  economically	  and	  politically.	  In	  
1957,	  after	  lengthy	  negotiations,	  the	  Treaties	  of	  Rome	  were	  signed	  establishing	  the	  European	  Economic	  
Community	  (EEC)	  and	  the	  European	  Atomic	  Energy	  Community	  (EURATOM).	  These	  3	  communities	  existid	  
independently	  until	  the	  Merger	  Treaty	  was	  signed	  in	  Brussels	  and	  came	  into	  force	  on	  the	  1st	  of	  July	  1967	  
thereby	  creating	  the	  European	  Communities.  The European Union as a genuine political entity, was 
created by the Maastrich Treaty signed on 7th of February 1992. The further integration of the 
European Union took place on 1 January 1994 by pushing forward the Economic and Monetary 
Union by establishing the European Monetary Institute and the development of the Euro as a 
single curency. The euro was launched in 1999 and the European Central Bank was established 
as well. The euro became the official single currency from the 1st of January thereby replacing all 
other old national currencies.  
 
In the beginning of this process, the founding fathers had a dream of an integrated Europe. 
However, I doubt they could have predicted that the European integration process would go this 
far. The EU is the most integrated area in the world as a political union with a single market and 
single currency. Thusfar, the EU has been a success story and has been used as a global 
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6.2. 	  TTIP	  as	  a	  geo-­‐political	  tool	  	  
The	  TTIP	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  as	  more	  than	  just	  a	  trade	  agreement	  since	  it	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  way	  to	  influence	  
geopolitics.	  Some	  analysts	  claim	  that	  the	  TTIP	  also	  means	  to	  create	  political	  spillover	  of	  Western	  civilisation.	  By	  
‘Western	  civilisation’	  the	  analysts	  mainly	  refer	  to	  the	  domincance	  of	  deregulated	  trade,	  private	  investments	  
and	  their	  guaranteed	  protection,	  property	  rights	  rather	  than	  social	  rights	  and	  stated	  intervention.	  If	  the	  EU	  and	  
the	  US	  combine	  their	  huge	  consumer	  markets	  then	  there	  is	  a	  big	  chance	  producers	  from	  other	  countries	  
worldwide	  will	  start	  to	  gravitate	  towards	  the	  standards	  set	  up	  between	  the	  EU-­‐US	  in	  order	  to	  be	  guaranteed	  
market	  access.	  In	  this	  case	  the	  TTIP’s	  harmonised	  product	  standards	  will	  be	  used	  as	  a	  regulatory	  blueprint	  
worldwide	  for	  trade	  deals (Choblet & Hager, 2015).	  Because	  there	  are	  so	  many	  countries	  dependent	  on	  the	  EU	  
and	  US	  market,	  they	  are	  likely	  to	  adopt	  the	  TTIP	  standards	  in	  order	  to	  keep	  market	  access	  guaranteed 
(Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2013).	  This	  might	  trigger	  a	  new	  wave	  of	  bilateral	  trade	  agreements	  by	  these	  countries	  in	  
order	  not	  to	  be	  excluded	  from	  the	  market.	  
	  
6.3. 	  EU	  and	  US:	  the	  trade-­‐related	  issues	  crusaders	  
Even	  though	  there	  are	  significant	  differences	  in	  the	  two	  transatlantic	  economic	  policies,	  there	  is	  enough	  
common	  ground	  to	  form	  a	  stabile	  bond	  between	  the	  two	  mastodonts.	  Even	  in	  dealing	  with	  nontrade	  issues,	  
both	  the	  US	  and	  the	  EU	  tried	  to	  improve	  labour	  and	  environmental	  standards	  in	  other	  countries	  via	  trade	  policy	  
measures.	  This	  way	  of	  doing	  business	  was	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  why	  the	  Seattle	  WTO	  ministerial	  meeting	  of	  1999	  
collapsed.	  Especially	  in	  the	  US,	  activism	  in	  trade	  areas	  has	  risen	  due	  to	  the	  influence	  of	  NGO’s	  and	  interest	  
groups	  in	  the	  decisionmaking	  process	  the	  open	  system	  of	  governance.	  These	  groups	  want	  to	  pursue	  their	  own	  
non-­‐trade	  objectives	  through	  the	  US’	  trade	  policy	  by	  calling	  them	  ‘trade-­‐related	  issues’.	  Especially	  in	  the	  field	  of	  
labour	  and	  environmental	  standards,	  this	  is	  a	  powerful	  tool	  to	  force	  these	  non-­‐trade	  issues	  onto	  foreign	  
countries.	  When	  confronted	  with	  the	  possibility	  of	  losing	  market	  access	  to	  a	  country	  like	  the	  US	  or	  EU	  the	  
foreign	  firms	  will	  almost	  certainly	  comply	  with	  the	  non-­‐trade	  issues	  as	  wel	  in	  order	  to	  make	  their	  products	  
conform	  (Wijkman,	  2003).	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The	  policy	  of	  enforcing	  trade-­‐related	  issues	  via	  RTAs	  is	  met	  with	  contradicting	  reactions.	  The	  NGOs	  in	  
developed	  countries	  are	  big	  supporters	  of	  this	  indirect	  enforcement	  of	  non-­‐trade	  issues,	  but	  developing	  
countries	  claim	  that	  rich	  countries	  try	  to	  blackmail	  them	  by	  forcing	  them	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  labour	  or	  
environmental	  standards	  by	  threatening	  the	  developing	  countries	  with	  loss	  of	  market	  acces.	  For	  developing	  
countries	  an	  RTA	  or	  FTA	  containing	  these	  kinds	  of	  trade-­‐related	  issues,	  is	  like	  a	  Trojan	  horse	  because	  it	  comes	  
under	  the	  guise	  of	  good	  intentions,	  but	  actually	  contains	  bigger	  commitments.	  	  
	  
The	  WTO	  agrees	  with	  the	  opinion	  of	  the	  developing	  countries	  and	  wants	  to	  ban	  developing	  countries	  from	  
imposing	  these	  kinds	  of	  standards	  on	  foreign	  producers	  who	  wish	  to	  import	  their	  goods.	  A	  good	  example	  of	  the	  
WTO’s	  stance	  is	  given	  in	  the	  prejudicial	  panel	  report	  on	  the	  ‘tuna-­‐dolfin’	  case	  between	  Mexico	  and	  the	  US 
(WTO panel report, 1991).	  Mexico	  argued	  that	  the	  US	  had	  illegally	  put	  an	  embargo	  on	  imported	  tuna	  from	  
Mexico	  because	  it	  was	  caught	  using	  purse	  seine	  nets.	  These	  kinds	  of	  nets	  form	  a	  danger	  for	  dolfins	  who	  get	  
stuck	  in	  them	  and	  die.	  The	  Marine	  Mammal	  Protection	  Act	  of	  1972	  forbids	  purse	  seine	  nets	  because	  of	  the	  
danger	  they	  form	  to	  dolfins.	  The	  US	  wanted	  to	  enforce	  this	  environmental	  standard	  indirectily	  through	  trade	  
policy,	  but	  their	  plan	  backfired	  when	  the	  WTO’s	  panel	  report	  spoke	  in	  favour	  of	  Mexico.	  The	  panel	  report	  
stated	  that	  the	  US	  is	  not	  allowed	  to	  enforce	  US	  legislation	  in	  Mexico	  because	  this	  is	  a	  form	  of	  extraterritoriality	  
and	  thus	  forms	  a	  violation	  of	  Mexico’s	  sovereignty.	  Even	  though	  the	  developed	  country’s	  intentions	  are	  good,	  
such	  as	  preventing	  child	  labour	  or	  protecting	  the	  environment,	  they	  are	  not	  allowed	  to	  justify	  trade	  
restrictions. (Wijkman, 2003)	  
	  
6.4. 	  EU’s	  integration	  process	  and	  US	  trade	  policy	  
From	  the	  EU’s	  integration	  process	  we	  learn	  that	  deep	  integration,	  i.e.	  regulatory	  integration	  and	  harmonisation	  
up	  to	  a	  customs	  union,	  is	  not	  harmful	  to	  global	  liberalisation.	  In	  fact,	  the	  regional	  RTAs	  that	  were	  formed	  
between	  the	  industrialised	  countries	  in	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s	  moved	  at	  a	  faster	  pace	  than	  the	  multilateral	  
trading	  system	  (Wijkman,	  2003).	  This	  is	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  regionalism	  forms	  a	  path	  with	  intermediate	  
organisation	  and	  structure	  that	  the	  international	  trading	  system	  can	  make	  use	  of.	  Herbert	  Simon	  wrote	  that	  
“the	  international	  economy	  is	  overwhelmingly	  vast,	  and	  the	  number	  of	  nations	  is	  correspondingly	  large.	  This	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system	  has	  become	  too	  large	  to	  deal	  with	  on	  an	  undifferentiated	  basis.	  There	  is	  a	  need	  to	  ‘decompose’	  the	  
system	  in	  order	  to	  manage	  it	  effctively,	  and	  regionalism	  presents	  a	  kind	  of	  ‘part-­‐within-­‐parts’	  decomposition	  
which	  is	  recommended	  by	  analysts	  who	  study	  complex	  systems.”	  (Simon,	  1962)	  
	  
The	  US	  trade	  policy	  has	  changed	  its	  course	  drastically	  since	  the	  1980s	  Reagan	  administration	  by	  going	  from	  a	  
multilateral	  to	  a	  bilateral	  approach.	  Over	  the	  years,	  the	  US	  has	  signed	  more	  bilateral	  agreements	  with	  
important	  partners.	  Some	  authors	  call	  this	  a	  ‘competition	  in	  liberalisation’	  and	  it	  is	  mainly	  happening	  between	  
industrialised	  countries	  like	  the	  US	  and	  the	  EU-­‐members.	  A	  lot	  of	  the	  parties	  to	  these	  RTAs	  have	  a	  set	  of	  shared	  
values,	  history,	  culture	  and	  needs	  which	  makes	  it	  far	  easier	  to	  come	  to	  an	  agreement	  compared	  to	  the	  
multilateral	  negotiation	  table	  (Wijkman,	  2003).	  	  
	  
In	  light	  of	  the	  consecutive	  EU	  enlargements,	  the	  US	  urged	  the	  GATT	  to	  create	  more	  rounds	  to	  lower	  the	  
common	  external	  tariff	  of	  the	  EU.	  Via	  the	  GATT	  rounds,	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  US	  negotiated	  tariff	  reductions	  that	  
were	  automatically	  extended	  to	  all	  the	  members	  of	  the	  WTO	  through	  the	  MFN-­‐principle.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  
recent	  global	  liberalisation	  is	  a	  result	  of	  the	  close	  exchange	  between	  regional	  and	  multilateral	  policies	  
(Wijkman,	  2003).	  
	  
The	  TTIP	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  US-­‐EU	  approximation,	  which	  has	  increased	  after	  the	  EU	  surpassed	  the	  
US	  as	  the	  Nr.1	  commercial	  power.	  No	  longer	  being	  the	  incontestable	  economic	  hegemon,	  the	  US	  feels	  the	  need	  
to	  partner	  up	  with	  its	  powerful	  ally	  in	  trade,	  the	  EU.	  The	  US	  pursues	  a	  multilateral	  approach	  because	  it	  is	  the	  
best	  way	  towards	  trade	  liberalisation.	  Stil,	  the	  US	  is	  cautious	  not	  to	  jeopardise	  its	  sovereignty	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  
multilateral	  trading	  system.	  In	  order	  to	  protect	  their	  sovereignty,	  the	  US	  prefers	  multilateral	  trade	  agreements	  
that	  are	  limited	  in	  scope	  such	  as	  agreements	  on	  market	  access,	  trade	  rules	  and	  procedures,	  in	  other	  words	  
‘shallow	  integration’.	  The	  EU’s	  trade	  policy,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  is	  driven	  by	  deep	  integration	  in	  becoming	  a	  
customs	  union	  and	  the	  most	  integrated	  trade	  and	  political	  area	  in	  the	  world.	  These	  different	  attitudes	  towards	  
the	  level	  of	  integration	  are	  also	  expressed	  in	  the	  US	  and	  EU’s	  vision	  of	  the	  TTIP.	  Whereas	  the	  EU	  is	  hammering	  
for	  environmental	  and	  labour	  regulations	  (deep	  regulatory	  integration),	  the	  US	  is	  very	  much	  concerned	  about	  
the	  ISDS	  mechanism	  since	  it	  does	  not	  want	  EU	  law	  to	  be	  applied	  on	  their	  companies.	  Still,	  there	  are	  signs	  that	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its	  transatlantic	  partner’s	  competition	  policy	  is	  increasingly	  affecting	  the	  US.	  Especially	  in	  the	  area	  of	  mergers	  
and	  acquisitions	  the	  US	  is	  taking	  over	  the	  European	  rules	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  multilateral	  agreements	  in	  this	  
area.	  In	  general	  and	  in	  particular	  with	  the	  TTIP	  it	  is	  beneficial	  for	  companies	  and	  consumers	  to	  adopt	  a	  
harmonised	  set	  of	  rules	  and	  procedures	  (Wijkman,	  2003).	  
	  
6.5. 	  EU	  and	  NAFTA	  approach.	  
Even	  though	  there	  are	  differences	  in	  the	  approaches	  between	  EU	  and	  NAFTA,	  examples	  have	  shown	  that	  there	  
can	  be	  compatibility	  between	  the	  two	  dominant	  players	  on	  the	  international	  forum.	  E.g.	  the	  EU-­‐Mexico	  free	  
trade	  agreement	  where	  the	  EU	  had	  to	  navigate	  its	  way	  around	  the	  existing	  regulations	  on	  services	  and	  public	  
procurement	  formed	  by	  NAFTA.	  NAFTA	  was	  formed	  before	  the	  GATS	  and	  thus	  contains	  divergent	  regulations	  
regarding	  services.	  In	  general	  differences	  in	  regulatory	  approaches	  increase	  the	  transaction	  costs	  of	  trade	  
negotiations.	  Even	  though	  there	  were	  substantial	  differences	  between	  NAFTA	  and	  EU	  approach,	  these	  
transpacific	  and	  cross-­‐regional	  differences	  were	  not	  impossible	  to	  overcome.	  In	  case	  of	  the	  NAFTA	  and	  EU,	  the	  
similarities	  appear	  to	  be	  bigger	  than	  the	  differences.	  That	  is	  why	  a	  consensual	  approach	  can	  be	  found	  to	  
consolidate	  the	  divergent	  approaches.	  The	  EU	  and	  NAFTA	  have	  made	  decisions	  about	  new	  trade	  policies	  that	  
are	  only	  partly,	  or	  not	  at	  all	  covered	  by	  WTO	  law.	  The	  question	  is	  what	  kind	  of	  effect	  these	  pre-­‐existing	  
decisions	  will	  have	  when	  the	  multilateral	  negotiations	  start	  on	  these	  trade	  policies	  (Reiter, 2003).	  
	  
Compared	  the	  EU,	  the	  USA	  has	  signed	  fewer	  RTAs	  over	  the	  last	  few	  decades	  because	  of	  its	  trade	  policy.	  The	  
USA	  has	  been	  trying	  to	  initiate	  global	  liberalisation	  via	  the	  GATT	  instead	  of	  going	  through	  the	  intermediate	  step	  
of	  RTAs.	  This	  policy	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  “regionalism	  with	  a	  global	  goal”	  by	  the	  United	  States’	  Trade	  
Representative	  Robert	  Zoellick	  (Zoellick,	  2015).	  Even	  though	  the	  US	  has	  shown	  a	  greater	  interest	  in	  RTAs	  during	  
recent	  years,	  policy	  analysts	  predict	  that	  the	  US	  will	  not	  give	  in	  to	  temptation	  to	  create	  more	  bilateral	  FTAs.	  
Since	  the	  US	  is	  a	  global	  trader,	  it	  benefits	  more	  from	  global	  than	  preferential	  liberalisation.	  This	  is	  why	  the	  
analysts	  predict	  that	  the	  FTAs	  made	  by	  the	  US	  are	  “part	  of	  a	  double	  header,	  rather	  than	  an	  exit	  from	  the	  
mulitilateral	  trading	  system”	  (Wijkman,	  2003).	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6.6. 	  The	  Euro-­‐Mediterranean	  Agreements	  
One	  of	  the	  important	  examples	  of	  European	  regulatory	  approach	  is	  the	  European-­‐Mediterranean	  Association	  
Agreements7	  (hereinafter	  EMAs)	  established	  in	  1995.	  During	  the	  so-­‐called	  “Barcelona-­‐process”	  the	  then	  
European	  Economic	  Community	  and	  its	  Mediterranean	  Partner	  Countries	  (MPCs)8	  negotiated	  to	  change	  the	  
pre-­‐existant	  individual	  cooperation	  agreements,	  which	  provided	  mainly	  asymmetrical	  duty-­‐free	  access	  of	  non-­‐
agricultural	  goods	  to	  the	  European	  single	  market,	  into	  a	  more	  harmonised	  unit	  of	  agreements	  (Baert,	  2003).	  	  
Some	  authors	  want	  to	  know	  if	  the	  EMAs	  are	  a	  form	  of	  imperial	  or	  hegemonic	  harmonisation	  formed	  by	  the	  EU	  
(Baldwin,	  Regulatory	  Protectionism,	  Developing	  Nations	  and	  a	  Two-­‐Tier	  World	  Trade	  System,	  2000)	  (Lawrence	  
R.	  Z.,	  1995).	  Hegemonic	  harmonisation,	  as	  defined	  by	  Baldwin	  (1995),	  means	  that	  the	  EU	  approach	  is	  to	  
transpose	  the	  basic	  set	  of	  EU	  rules	  and	  definitions.	  There	  is	  a	  de	  facto	  approximation	  by	  the	  MPCs	  trade	  
policies	  to	  the	  EU’s.	  The	  MPCs	  know	  they	  are	  the	  ones	  that	  have	  to	  change,	  because	  the	  EU	  will	  not.	  (Baert,	  
2003).	  
	  
Baldwin	  suggests	  that	  according	  to	  his	  domino	  theory,	  meaning	  that	  a	  change	  in	  the	  preferential	  status	  of	  
country	  A	  will	  change	  the	  position	  of	  all	  the	  other	  countries	  in	  the	  hierarchic	  pyramid.	  This	  change	  of	  position	  
will	  in	  its	  turn	  lead	  the	  affected	  countries	  to	  ask	  for	  deeper	  integration	  and	  expanding	  the	  preferential	  status	  
(Baldwin,	  A	  Domino	  Theory	  of	  Regionalism,	  1995).	  The	  EMAs	  are	  a	  good	  examole	  of	  North-­‐South	  integration.	  It	  
might	  seem	  like	  a	  good	  opportunity	  for	  the	  EU	  to	  follow	  its	  approach	  of	  exporting	  its	  own	  regulatory	  model	  
since	  there	  is	  no	  other	  strong	  regulatory	  framework.	  When	  the	  Southern	  countries	  are	  economically	  
dependent	  on	  their	  Northern	  allies,	  the	  former	  often	  allign	  their	  rules	  and	  policies	  with	  those	  of	  the	  North	  even	  
when	  they	  are	  not	  obliged	  to	  (Baert,	  2003).	  	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  The	  EMA	  consists	  of	  the	  EU	  and	  seven	  other	  members:	  Lebanon,	  Egypt,	  Israel,	  Tunisia,	  Jordan,	  Morocco	  and	  Algeria	  
8	  The	  current	  European	  Mediterranean	  Partnership:	  EU,	  Lebanon,	  Egypt,	  Israel,	  Morocco,	  Tunesia,	  Jordan,	  Turkey,	  
Palestine,	  Libya,	  Syria	  and	  Algeria.	  Currently	  the	  partnership	  with	  Libya	  and	  Syria	  is	  suspended.	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The	  Europe	  Agreements	  that	  the	  EU	  has	  with	  the	  Central	  and	  East	  European	  neighbours	  fall	  under	  a	  differents	  
approach.	  Since	  complying	  with	  the	  acquis	  communautaire	  is	  a	  conditio	  sine	  qua	  non	  for	  accession	  to	  the	  EU,	  
the	  agreements	  with	  the	  Central	  and	  East	  European	  countries	  contain	  much	  more	  WTO-­‐plus	  provisions.	  In	  this	  
case	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  EU	  exports	  its	  own	  regulatory	  model	  onto	  those	  countries.	  The	  cooperation	  between	  
the	  EU	  and	  the	  MPCs	  strives	  to	  improve	  the	  intstitutional	  infrastructure	  to	  make	  the	  region	  more	  competitive	  
and	  make	  it	  more	  attractive	  for	  FDI.	  Through	  this	  mechanism	  RTAs	  can	  encourage	  national	  regulatory	  reform	  in	  
order	  to	  gain	  more	  competitiveness	  (Baert,	  2003).	  
	  
There	  is	  evidence	  of	  potential	  economic	  welfare	  gains	  in	  this	  North-­‐South	  venture	  through	  deep	  integration.	  
This	  kind	  of	  deeper	  integration	  surpasses	  that	  Vinerian	  gains	  that	  come	  from	  ‘shallow’	  integration	  and	  usually	  
contain	  nother	  more	  but	  tariff	  regulations.	  The	  establishment	  of	  the	  EU-­‐Mexico	  agreement,	  NAFTA	  and	  the	  EU	  
membership	  of	  Southern	  European	  countries	  like	  Portugal,	  Spain	  and	  Greece	  all	  point	  in	  the	  direction	  that	  
regional	  integration	  will	  increase	  competition,	  invesment	  and	  efficiency	  (Baert,	  2003).	  
	  
	  
6.7. EU	  approach	  on	  Food	  safety	  and	  eco-­‐labelling	  	  
The	  EU	  approach	  concerning	  food	  safety	  and	  eco-­‐labelling	  is	  very	  distinct	  from	  its	  transatlantic	  counterpart.	  
Concerning	  genetically	  modified	  (GM)	  crops,	  the	  EU	  took	  a	  diliberate	  stance	  that	  differed	  trom	  the	  existing	  
approach	  most	  developed	  countries	  were	  following.	  Environmental	  pressure	  groups	  are	  advocating	  an	  EU	  bio-­‐
label	  for	  fruits	  and	  vegetables	  grown	  organically	  in	  the	  EU	  to	  make	  the	  customer	  aware	  of	  what	  he	  or	  she	  is	  
buying	  (Isaac,	  2003).	  The	  EU	  and	  US	  both	  have	  strict	  and	  severe	  food	  safety	  measures,	  but	  their	  philosophy	  
behind	  it	  is	  quite	  different.	  Let	  us	  look	  at	  the	  case	  of	  chlorinated	  chickens	  for	  example;	  in	  the	  US	  dead	  chickens	  
are	  washed	  in	  chlorine	  to	  kill	  all	  bacteria,	  whilst	  in	  Europe	  this	  technique	  is	  forbidden	  because	  the	  chlorine	  can	  
affect	  human	  health	  negatively.	  Both	  entities	  have	  the	  same	  goal,	  but	  use	  different	  measures	  that	  are	  not	  
excempted	  on	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  Atlantic.	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7. Conclusion	  	  
Scholars	  of	  international	  political	  economy	  and	  practitioners	  in	  international	  trade	  remain	  divided	  on	  the	  issue	  
of	  regionalism	  versus	  multilateralism	  notwithstanding	  a	  vast	  amount	  of	  empirical	  studies.	  Even	  within	  the	  
smaller	  circle	  of	  liberal	  economists,	  opposing	  views	  concerning	  the	  effect	  of	  RTAs	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  global	  trade	  
regime	  remain	  afoot.	  As	  elaborated	  above,	  different	  studies	  conducted	  by	  different	  institutions	  came	  out	  with	  
different	  trade	  effects	  for	  the	  same	  RTA	  due	  to	  the	  usage	  of	  different	  parameters	  like	  estimation	  methods,	  
time	  periods	  and	  databases	  to	  measure	  the	  effect	  the	  RTA	  has	  on	  trade.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	  which	  
methodology	  is	  being	  used	  in	  a	  certain	  study	  in	  order	  to	  interpret	  the	  conclusion	  in	  a	  critical	  way.	  	  
	  
RTAs	  might	  create	  trade	  diversion	  if	  they	  increase	  external	  trade	  barriers	  to	  protect	  national	  inefficient	  
industries,	  but	  when	  thought	  through	  well,	  they	  can	  lead	  to	  trade	  creation.	  Especially	  when	  the	  RTA	  members	  
are	  already	  major	  trading	  partners,	  the	  RTA	  will	  most	  likely	  lead	  to	  trade	  creation.	  The	  WTO’s	  DSB	  should	  
therefore	  keep	  up	  its	  binding	  dispute	  settlement	  mechanism.	  A	  revision	  or	  at	  least	  a	  clear	  listing	  of	  the	  
requirement	  of	  article	  XXIV	  GATT	  by	  jurisprudence	  would	  increase	  legal	  security	  and	  lessen	  disputes	  regarding	  
the	  scope	  of	  the	  requirements.	  
	  
Despite	  its	  potential	  harmful	  consequences,	  regionalism	  might	  be	  the	  only	  way	  forward	  when	  multilateral	  
negotiations	  are	  lagging.	  Most	  economic	  studies	  show	  that	  much	  can	  be	  gained	  from	  economic	  integration	  
such	  as	  market	  access	  and	  elimination	  of	  tariffs.	  Especially	  East	  Asia	  and	  Asia	  Pacific	  are	  the	  two	  regions	  that	  
show	  a	  lot	  of	  growing	  potential	  if	  they	  should	  form	  RTAs.	  The	  WTO	  does	  not	  need	  to	  be	  an	  outsider	  in	  all	  of	  this	  
for	  it	  possesses	  the	  infrastructure	  needed	  to	  curtail	  potential	  external	  negative	  effects	  of	  RTAs;	  it	  has	  a	  binding	  
dispute	  mechanism,	  international	  agreements,	  a	  platform	  for	  multilateral	  discussions	  etc.	  With	  all	  of	  these	  
safeguards	  in	  place,	  I	  believe	  that	  RTAs	  can	  form	  building	  blocks	  for	  the	  multilateral	  trading	  order.	  And	  the	  
bigger	  the	  blocks,	  the	  easier	  it	  is	  to	  build	  towards	  a	  harmonised	  union	  of	  trade	  rules.	  
What	  is	  clear	  that	  in	  all	  of	  this,	  is	  that	  the	  TTIP	  will	  undoubtfully	  have	  beneficial	  effects	  for	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  US.	  
Since	  the	  TTIP	  is	  a	  form	  of	  the	  new	  regionalism,	  it	  has	  deep	  integration	  as	  its	  objective.	  That	  is	  why	  it	  will	  not	  go	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against	  the	  WTO’s	  principles	  of	  MFN.	  Thus, in relation with the pros and cons theories on regionalism, TTIP 
could function as a steping stone or building bloc for a wider liberalization of trade and investment not only 
interms of traditional tariff rates reduction but also in areas of harmonization of standards and rule makings. 
	  
	  
After	  comparing	  the	  TTIP	  to	  the	  theoretical	  framework,	  it	  is	  almost	  certain	  that	  the	  TTIP	  will	  not	  form	  an	  
obstacle	  for	  the	  WTO.	  It	  focuses	  on	  deep	  integration,	  a	  stage	  that	  the	  WTO	  is	  not	  yet	  ready	  for	  with	  all	  of	  its	  
members.	  However,	  advanced	  economies	  like	  those	  of	  the	  US	  and	  the	  EU	  can	  liberalise	  furher	  while	  
multilateral	  trade	  talks	  have	  stagnated.	  The	  TTIP	  might	  also	  create	  political	  and	  technological	  spillovers	  for	  
other	  countries,	  which	  will	  benefit	  competition.	  If	  the	  TTIP	  works	  out	  well,	  it	  can	  form	  a	  potential	  future	  
blueprint	  for	  other	  agreements	  or	  for	  the	  multilateral	  trading	  system.	  Not	  all	  parts	  of	  the	  TTIP	  have	  been	  
agreed	  upon	  by	  both	  parties	  and	  there	  is	  still	  some	  resistance	  from	  the	  public,	  so	  we	  will	  have	  to	  sit	  and	  wait	  
for	  the	  final	  result	  of	  the	  negotiations.	  The	  TTIP	  can	  eliminate	  the	  last	  barriers	  that	  stand	  between	  the	  already	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